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Dear Mr President 
Dear Madam Speaker 
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1. Quality  early  childhood  education  and  care  offers  a  wide  range  of 
benefits to Australian families. The benefits accruing from higher quality care 
include  assisting  children  in  establishing  foundations  for  learning  and 
preparation  for  subsequent  schooling,  and  assisting  parents  who  wish  to 
remain  in  or  re‐enter  the  workforce.  Many  parents  choose  to  send  their 
children to formal care provided by a licenced early childhood education and 
care service—most commonly long day care, or family day care. There are over 
6000  long day  child  care  centres nationally  run by  small and  large  for‐profit 
and not‐for‐profit organisations.  
2. Significant  reforms  have  occurred  since  2009  in  the  Australian  early 
childhood  education  and  care  sector  following  agreement  by  the  Council  of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in that year to the National Partnership on the 
National  Quality  Agenda  for  Early  Childhood  Education  and  Care.  A  key 
element  of  this  agreement  was  the  development  of  the  National  Quality 
Framework  (NQF) which replaced  the various  licensing and quality assurance 
processes that had previously existed in each state and territory. The NQF also 
introduced minimum staff to child ratios and worker qualification requirements. 
In  agreeing  to  the  reforms  and  in  establishing  a  shared vision1  for  the  sector, 
COAG recognised that there were significant workforce supply, recruitment and 
retention  issues and  that  in order  to achieve  its vision, steps would need  to be 
taken to strengthen the early childhood education and care workforce.  
3. Reflecting  on  the  potential  impact  of  the  reforms  associated  with  the 
national quality agenda, the 2011 Productivity Commission report into the Early 
Childhood Development Workforce noted  that  the  reforms would significantly 
increase the demand for workers2 and that supply was likely to respond slowly. 
The  Commission  suggested  that  proposed  timeframes  for  reform,  which 
expected  full  implementation  by  1 January 2014,  were  optimistic.  Further,  the 
                                                     
1  COAG’s vision that by 2020 all children have the best start to life to create a better future for 
themselves and for the nation is set out in Investing in the Early Years—A National Early Childhood 
Development Strategy July 2009. 
2  The Productivity Commission estimated that about 15 000 more workers were likely to be required 
than would otherwise be the case, and the average level of workers’ qualifications would need to 
increase. Productivity Commission, Early Childhood Development Workforce, 2011, p.xxii. 
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Commission observed  that  the  reform program was  likely  to be  expensive  for 
both  governments  and  parents,  as  increased  staff  numbers,  and  the  higher 
wages—anticipated  in  response  to  the  increase  in  demand—would  drive  up 
service  costs.  At  the  time  the  then  government  was  considering  its  reform 
directions, the union representing some elements of the workforce, United Voice, 
was also advocating  for a range of  improvements  in pay and conditions  in  the 
sector, and approached the government with a proposal seeking $1.4 billion for a 
workforce compact3, similar to that provided for the aged care4 sector. 
4. To progress  reforms and  respond  to  the broader wage pressures  then 
evident,  the  Australian  Government  committed  $300 million5  (on 
19 March 2013)  to  establish  the  Early  Years  Quality  Fund  (EYQF)  with  the 
intended purpose of providing grants  to  long day care providers  in order  to 
supplement  wage  increases  against  an  agreed wage  schedule  for  child  care 
workers  for a period of  two years.6 The grants were  to be made available  to 
providers  on  a  first‐in  first‐served  basis  and  an  advisory  board  comprising 
individuals7  from  the  sector  was  established  to  provide  advice  during  the 
implementation and design phases of the fund.8 
Parliamentary interest and consideration 
5. The  then  government  also  determined  that  it  would  use  a  Special 
Account  to  establish  the  fund  and  on  30 May 2013,  the  Early Years  Quality 
Fund  Special  Account  Bill  2013  (the  Bill)  was  introduced  into  Parliament. 
Reflecting the level of public interest in the early childhood education and care 
sector,  the Bill  attracted  significant  stakeholder  attention. A  large number of 
                                                     
3  The workforce compact was envisaged as an arrangement which provided employers with access to 
Commonwealth funds if they agreed to pass on the funds as wage increases to employees. 
4  In the 2012–13 Budget, the then government provided $1.2 billion over five years to address workforce 
pressures in the aged care sector. 
5  A total of $314 million was committed over five years comprising: $300 million over two years for the 
EYQF; $8 million over three years for the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations to administer the Fund, and the establishment of the Early Years Quality Fund Advisory 
Board and $6 million over four years to establish a Pay Equity Unit in the Fair Work Commission. 
6  Wage increases would be in accordance with a wage schedule and would equate to $3 per hour for 
Certificate III qualified educators, with proportionally adjusted wage increases for other child care 
workers and diploma and degree qualified educators. United Voice had proposed that the government 
provide $1.4 billion for a workforce compact in order to provide wage increases of $5 per hour. 
7  Individuals on the board included representatives from employee and employer groups and peak 
bodies. 
8  The advisory board’s role as set out in its Terms of Reference included providing advice on: eligibility 
criteria; equitable funding distribution; application and assessment processes; conditionality of funding; 
monitoring and reporting to ensure transparency and compliance; and engagement and 
communication with the early childhood education and care sector.  
Summary 
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expected  to arise, as only a proportion of  the early  childhood education and 
care  sector would  be  eligible  to  receive  funding. Concerns were  raised with 
respect  to  the  amount  of  funds  available—$300 million  over  two  years  was 
considered  insufficient by stakeholders to provide wage  increases for all  long 
day care educators and questions were raised about the impact on wages and 
resourcing when  funding ceased. The proposed  first‐in  first‐served approach 
to  awarding  grants  also  drew  concern  from  small  providers  and  sector 
representative  bodies  who  considered  that  the  approach  risked  locking  out 
smaller providers  from  funding as  they did not have  the  resources of  larger 





on 1 July 2013 with  the object of  improving quality outcomes  for  children  in 
early childhood education and care services, by enhancing professionalism  in 
the  sector,  including  through  improved  attraction  and  retention  of  a  skilled 
and  professional  workforce.  The  Special  Accountʹs  use  was  restricted  to 
remuneration and other employment related costs and expenses. The account 
was  credited  with  $135 million  on  commencement  (1 July 2013),  with  the 
remaining $165 million to be credited on 1 July 2014. Funding was to be made 
available to eligible employers in the form of a grant. 
Commonwealth grants framework 
7. The provision of grants  is a means commonly used by  the Australian 




(CGGs)10,  which  aimed  to  promote  fair  and  equitable  access  to  grant 
                                                     
9  Minister for School Education, Early Childhood and Youth, The Hon Peter Garrett MP, Second 
Reading speech; the Early Years Special Account Bill 2013, 25 June 2013.  
10  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines – Policies and Principles 
for Grants Administration, Financial Management Guidance No. 3, Canberra, June 2013 (2nd Ed). 
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opportunities.11  The  CGGs  included  several  mandatory  requirements  in 
relation  to decision making by Ministers and reporting, as well as a range of 
better  practice  principles  to  guide  government  entities  in  their  approach  to 




8. In  agreeing  to  the  EYQF,  the  then  government  sought  to  achieve 
outcomes  quickly,  setting  a  date  of  1 July 2013  for  the  disbursement  of  the 
grants. This provided  a  little  over  three months  for  the  then Department  of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations  (DEEWR,  the department) 
to  put  in  place  all  the  necessary  arrangements  to  implement  the  program, 
including  conducting  the  grants  assessment  process.  The  government  also 
adopted  (as  noted  in  paragraph  4)  a  demand‐driven,  first‐in  first‐served 
approach for the allocation of grants as it considered this would be more likely 
to  meet  its  timeframes.  Under  the  approach,  eligible  applications  would  be 
processed in the order received and accepted for funding until the funding cap 
of  $300 million  was  reached.  The  CGGs  allowed  for  a  number  of  different 
approaches  to  awarding  grants  including  through  demand‐driven  processes 
under which applications that satisfy stated eligibility criteria receive funding, 
up to the limit of available appropriations.  
9. The  government  had  initially  decided  that  the  best  way  to  promote 
equitable  access  to  the  EYQF  was  to  require  grant  applications  at  the 
individual service level rather than at the provider level, in recognition of the 
fact  that  there  was  wide  divergence  in  provider  types,  ranging  from  single 
operators  or  small  providers  through  to  large  multi‐site  service  providers. 




11  The audit has referenced the grants framework that was in place at the time that the program operated 
(in particular, the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), Financial 
Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (FMA Regulations) and the CGGs). The framework 
changed after the EYQF closed, with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 
2013 (PGPA Act) taking effect from 1 July 2014 and the issuing of the Commonwealth Grants Rules 
and Guidelines (CGRGs) to replace the CGGs. 
12  The first version of the ANAO Better Practice Guide on Grants Administration was published in 1994, 
and was updated in 1997, 2002, 2010 and 2013. 
Summary 
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funding  was  also  influenced  by  provider  size,  with  small  providers 
(1‐15 services)  allocated  a  pool  of  $150 million  and  large  providers 
(16+ services) allocated the remaining $150 million, also following advice from 
the advisory board. 
10. Access  to  the EYQF was  through  an  email  application  process  using 
forms provided on the departmentʹs website. To apply for funding, applicants 
were  required  to download and  complete application  forms and  lodge  them 
with  the  department  by  email  in  accordance  with  the  EYQF  guidelines. 
Applications  opened  on  Tuesday 23 July 2013.  The  department  registered  a 
total of 1173 submissions from early childhood education and care providers, 
with a  total of 453 applications being approved  for  funding  from  the EYQF.13 
To  receive  the  proposed  funding,  successful  providers  then  needed  to  take 
steps to meet the conditions in the offer including putting in place or varying 
enterprise  agreements  to  reflect  the  agreed  EYQF  wage  schedule.  In  late 
August 2013,  44 providers  had  met  the  conditions  of  offer,  and  funding 
agreements were progressed  for 16 of  these providers  (15  small and 1  large) 
prior  to  the  2013 Federal  election.  These  16  agreements  provided  for  the 
payment of grants totalling $137 million.  




program  is directed  towards assisting educators  in  long day  care  services  to 





total of $62.5 million had been paid  to  the 16 providers. Of  the $62.5 million, 
$51.3 million  was  for  wages,  $4.9 million  for  on‐costs  and  $6.3 million  for 
                                                     
13  Applications could be received in multiple email submissions. 
14  PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia (PwC) was commissioned by the Department of Education to 
conduct a review of the Early Years Quality Fund. The final report of the review, Ministerial review of 
the Early Years Quality Fund is dated 12 November 2013 and was released to the public on 
10 December 2013. 
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professional  development.  Conditional  funding  offers  for  the  remaining 
applications (made in August 2013) were revoked on 11 October 2013. 
Request for review by the Auditor-General 
13. The  government’s  review  raised  a  number  of  concerns  about  the 
manner  in which  the EYQF had been  implemented. Following  the  release of 
the review on 10 December 2013, Mr Alex Hawke MP wrote in December 2013 
to  the Auditor‐General  requesting  that  an  audit  of  the EYQF be  considered. 
The Auditor‐General agreed that in light of the matters that had been raised, a 
performance audit would be conducted. The audit commenced in March 2014. 
Audit objective, criteria and scope 
14. The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the establishment, 
implementation  and  operation  of  the  EYQF  against  the  requirements  of  the 
Early  Years  Quality  Fund  Special  Account  Act  2013  and  the  Commonwealth 
grants administration framework.  
15. To conclude against the audit objective, the high level criteria included 
whether  the program planning  and  implementation  complied with  the  legal 
framework, appropriately considered risks and was consistent with the EYQF 
policy  intent,  and  the  grant  selection  processes  were  undertaken  in  an 
equitable  and  transparent  way  consistent  with  relevant  legislation  and  the 
Commonwealth Grant Guidelines. 
16. The  EYQF  was  implemented  by  the  Department  of  Education, 
Employment  and  Workplace  Relations  (DEEWR)  and,  following  the  2013 
Federal election, the Department of Education. For ease of reading, this report 
refers  to  DEEWR,  unless  otherwise  noted.  Under  the  Administrative 
Arrangements  Order  promulgated  on  23 December 2014,  the  Department  of 
Education  became  the  Department  of  Education  and  Training,  and  early 
childhood  programs  were  transferred  to  the  Department  of  Social  Services 
(DSS).15 The Department of  the Prime Minister and Cabinet  (PM&C) and  the 
Department  of  Finance were  involved  in  the development  of  the EYQF  and 
were also included in the audit. 
                                                     
15  As the EYQF had been terminated in 2013, DSS did not have any role in its implementation. 
Summary 
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17. The  Early  Years  Quality  Fund  (EYQF)  was  created  to  assist  in  the 
attraction  and  retention  of  skilled  and  professional  child  care  educators.  In 
particular, the EYQF was intended to allow for increased wage rates for child 




$300 million funding cap was reached  less  than 13 hours after  the application 
process commenced. 
18. Successful  implementation of policy  initiatives  requires early,  informed 
and systematic consideration of implementation issues. The design of the EYQF 
policy  contained  inherent  risks  and  it  was  foreseeable  that  these  risks—
particularly  the  funding  constraints,  the  first‐in  first‐served  approach  and  the 
short  timeframe—would affect access  to  the program and  its ultimate success. 
While  decisions  on  policy  are  a  matter  for  government,  departments  are 
expected  to provide  frank, comprehensive and  timely advice16  to Ministers on 
both policy design and implementation risks as part of the policy development 
process.  This  role  was  made  somewhat  more  challenging  for  this  program 
because  many  of  the  key  elements  of  the  EYQF  policy  were  developed  by 
advisers in the offices of the Prime Minister and Finance Minister in negotiation 
with  the key stakeholder  representing child care workers. The elements of  the 
program  were  then  settled  through  correspondence  by  key  Ministers,  rather 
than  through  the more  conventional Cabinet  processes. Advice was  given  to 
government at various stages  in the design of the policy measure from several 
different  departments.  However,  the  development  of  the  measure  had  some 
momentum  and  the  advice  provided  by  departments  gained  little  traction. 
Nevertheless, there were gaps in departmental advice on a number of significant 
matters  at  different  times.  These  included  the  inherent  risk  in  the  use  of  a 
demand‐driven grants application process and, at  later  stages,  the accuracy of 
the  proposed  wage  schedule  and  the  potential  impact  on  smaller  child  care 
providers of several of the advisory board recommendations. 
                                                     
16  The APS Code of Conduct values include responsiveness through providing frank, honest, 
comprehensive, accurate and timely advice to the government and in implementing the government's 
policies and programs. <http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/aps-values-and-
code-of-conduct/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice> [Accessed on 31 October 2014]. 
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19. Following  the  then government’s decision  to  adopt  the EYQF policy, 
DEEWR  became  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  program.  The 
department  was  experienced  in  program  implementation  and  promptly 
established  arrangements  to  manage  the  grant  process  to  meet  the  short 
timeframe set by  the government  for  the commencement of  the program. To 
some extent  the development of key policy elements prior  to any  significant 
involvement  of  the  department  presented  challenges  to  successful 
implementation, although  in  the event, key risks evident  in  the design of  the 
policy  were  compounded  by  inadequacies  in  the  department’s  subsequent 
administration of the EYQF. 
20. Facilitating  equitable  access  to  the  program  by  applicants  was  a 




was  also  affected  by  limited  consultation  and  public  information  about  the 
EYQF  grant  process.  While  communication  with  the  sector  was  initially 
intended  to be managed by  the EYQF advisory board,  in practice  the board’s 
ability to inform the sector was constrained by delays in its establishment. The 
board also resolved to amend its charter to emphasise its advisory role rather 
than  its representation role. In  this context  it considered  that  it would have a 
limited  role  in  communicating with  the  sector, although  it agreed  to publish 
post meeting  communiques  to  provide  a  broad  description  of  the  decisions 
made at board meetings. The department’s own advice to the sector was very 
limited. Combined with the short timeframe set by the then government—two 
working  days  between  the  guidelines  being  released  and  the  program 
applications  opening—communication  was  not  conducive  to  a  first‐in 
first‐served  environment,  where  applicants  needed  to  be  poised  to  make 
business decisions and act quickly when applications opened.  
21. The department’s  system  for processing  applications  needed particular 
attention  to  preserve  equity  of  access  in  the  management  of  the  first‐in 
first‐served process. The email based system adopted by the department was not 
fit  for  purpose  and  did  not  fully  maintain  the  first‐in  order  of  applications. 
Complexity  and  inconsistency  within  the  grant  guidelines  also  presented 
difficulties;  applicants did not  always  follow  the  instructions  in  the guidelines 
Summary 
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and  did  not  always  submit  complete  applications.  After  identifying  problems 
with  the applications,  the department varied  the assessment process at  several 
points while it was underway and also repeated a large number of assessments.17  
22. Overall,  while  the  department  set  about  to  achieve  the  timeframes 
expected  by  the  then  government,  it  did  not  demonstrate  a  disciplined 
approach  to  implementation  that  satisfied  the  requirements  of  the  program 
and the Commonwealth Grant Guidelines (CGGs). As a result, EYQF processes 
and  procedures  were  not  as  well  developed  as  they  should  have  been  and 
there  were  risks  that  could  have  been  better  managed  in  the  registration, 
application  and  approval  processes,  in  the  development  of  funding 
agreements,  and  in  the  management  of  stakeholder  expectations.  Further, 
significant  decisions—made  during  the  grant  assessment  process—were  not 
fully  considered  or  documented,  which  reduced  transparency  in  relation  to 
key assessment and funding decisions.  
23. At  the  completion  of  the  grant  assessment  process,  453 grants 
(contained  within  approximately  580  submissions)  were  approved  covering 
approximately  1309 child  care  services,  and  almost  24 000 employees.  This 
represented  around  30 per cent  of  long  day  care  staff  and  20 per cent  of 
services.  There were  approximately  590 submissions  not  approved  for  grant 
funding. Noting that 554 submissions were received from small providers after 
the  funding cap was reached. By close of business 6 September 2013,  the day 
prior  to  the  Federal  election,  funding  agreements  had  been  sent  to  1  large 
provider, Goodstart Early Learning (for $132 million), and 15 small providers 
(for  a  total of  $5 million)  covering  11 710  employees. Subsequently, program 
changes have resulted in the 16 agreements being either varied or terminated. 
As at 30 June 2014, $62.5 million had been paid under EYQF. 
24. This  audit  report  draws  attention  to  the  risks  departments  face  in 
implementing  grant  programs,  particularly  in  circumstances  where 
requirements are  largely determined by Ministers and  their offices, and short 
timeframes  are provided  in which  to develop  and  implement  arrangements. 
Nevertheless, departments still have an  important role  in clearly drawing  the 
attention of Ministers to implementation risks so as to reduce the likelihood of 
downstream  problems  affecting  service  delivery  or  equity  of  access  to 
                                                     
17  Although the variations took into account the original basis for the criteria, not all changes were 
documented, some were not uniformly applied and records with respect to the variations were not 
adequately maintained. 
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funding  was  capped  and  risks  of  oversubscription  were  recognised.  Key 
lessons  arising  from  the  implementation  of  the  EYQF  program  include  the 
importance of providing: frank, comprehensive and timely advice to Ministers 
in relation to implementation risks and opportunities for mitigating these risks 
where  possible;  keeping  stakeholders  informed  of  developments,  including 
when programs reach full capacity; and ensuring that in demand‐driven grant 
programs,  the program guidelines are  followed  to ensure, as  far as possible, 
equity  of  access  by  applicants  to  available  funds.  A  key  step  to  achieving 
success  in  implementing  policy  on  time,  budget  and  to  government’s 
expectations is to give consideration to implementation as a fundamental part 
of all stages of policy development.18 
25. The  audit  has  made  one  recommendation,  observing  that  the  EYQF 
program  has  been  terminated  and  replaced with  an  alternative  professional 
development  program  for  child  care  educators.  That  said,  the  matters 
discussed in paragraph 24, together with the recommendation, are of relevance 
to  other Commonwealth  entities  and  are  intended  to  inform  the design  and 
implementation of future programs. 
Key findings by chapter 
Chapter 2 – Development of the Early Years Quality Fund 
26. Providing well  founded policy advice  is a core role  for  the Australian 









early  in  2013  this  strategy  was  overtaken  by  policy  being  developed  by 
Ministers’  advisers  in  the  Finance,  Treasurer’s  and  Prime  Minister’s  Offices 
                                                     
18  The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Australian National Audit Office, October 
2014, Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives Better Practice Guide, p.i. 
19  Ibid. p. 13. 
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and  culminated  in  the  child  care  workforce  strategy.  The  strategy  was 
significant  in  that  it  identified  the  key  policy  parameters  of  the  EYQF, 
including  the  first‐in  first‐served  approach  to  grants,  and  the  need  for 
providers to comply with the NQF and have an enterprise agreement in place. 
27. Advice  on  the  policy  under  negotiation  was  sought  from  central 
agencies  (the Departments  of  the Prime Minister  and Cabinet, Treasury  and 
Finance)  as  it  developed.  Early  in  the  policy  development  stage,  central 
agencies  provided  joint  advice  on  the  policy  to  their  respective  Ministers 
highlighting  key  issues—including  cost,  scope,  eligibility  and  timing—for 
consideration  prior  to  any  decisions  being  taken.  This  advice  proposed 
alternative  longer  term options which aligned more closely with  the existing 
Australian Government support to the sector and which were considered less 
likely to have a distortionary effect. The briefing was comprehensive in many 
respects and recommended among other  things,  that a smaller wage  increase 
be  provided  to  all  long  day  care  workers,  rather  than  a  large  increase  to  a 
relatively small sub‐set of workers. Although the briefing did not include any 
advice or caution  in relation  to  the use of a  first‐in  first‐served approach,  the 
briefing  commented  on  the  implications  of  restricting  the  EYQF  to  a  small 
number of providers.  
28. As  the department  that would have responsibility  for  implementation 
of the EYQF, DEEWR’s approach to the provision of advice was variable. After 
providing initial advice to the then government on options to progress reforms 
in  the  child  care  sector  in 2012 and early  in 2013,  the department’s  role was 
largely  limited  to  contributing  to  advice  being  prepared  by  central  agencies 
until being requested by the Prime Minister’s Office to prepare correspondence 
for  the  Minister  for  School  Education,  Early  Childhood  and  Youth,  seeking 
policy  authority  from  the  Prime  Minister  for  the  EYQF.  In  addition  to 
preparing  the  draft  correspondence,  a  department  would  generally  be 
expected to advise its Minister, including in respect of any significant risks to 
the policy design or implementation, and opportunities to mitigate those risks 
in  the  event  the  government  determined  to  proceed  with  the  proposal. 
Although the department held concerns around some aspects of the proposal 
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Chapter 3 – Implementation of the Early Years Quality Fund 
Program 
29. Successful  program  implementation  relies  on  the  identification  and 





Communication with  the  sector was  initially  intended  to be managed by  the 
EYQF advisory board. However,  the board’s ability  to  inform  the sector was 
constrained by delays in the establishment of the board and consequent delays 
in  the  meeting  schedule.  At  its  first  meeting  in  June  2013,  the  board  also 
resolved  to  amend  its  charter  to  emphasise  its  advisory  role  rather  than  its 
representation  role.  In  this context  it considered  that  it would have a  limited 
role  in  communicating  with  the  sector,  although  it  agreed  to  publish  post 
meeting communiques to provide a broad description of the decisions made at 
board meetings. The department’s own advice to the sector was very  limited. 
The  department  was  aware  that  the  lack  of  consultation  was  a  concern  for 
some  stakeholders  and  it  should  have  put  in  place  actions  to  remedy  the 
situation. The communication approach, combined with the complexity of the 
guidelines and the short timeframe set by the then government (two working 
days  between  the  guidelines  being  released  and  the  program  applications 
opening),  was  not  conducive  to  a  first‐in  first‐served  environment,  where 





out  in  the  award,  which  affected  the  amount  of  grant  funding  allocated  to 
some applications. As a result, the department could not confirm the accuracy 
of  the  requested,  and  subsequently  approved,  funding  amounts.  Further, 
although  the department was  aware of  stakeholder  concerns with  respect  to 
program  access  for  smaller  providers  (reported  during  the  Parliamentary 
inquiries),  it did not draw  to  the Minister’s attention  the disparity created by 
the advisory board’s recommendation to split funding equally  into two pools 
for  large  and  small providers.  In  effect,  this decision meant  that  the  smaller 
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Chapter 4 – Grant Selection Process 
31. EYQF  grants  were  to  be  allocated  on  a  demand‐driven,  first‐in 
first‐served basis. To  support equitable access  to  the EYQF,  the department 
needed  to adopt an approach which accurately captured  the  receipt  time of 
each application and allowed for the efficient processing of applications. The 
system  needed  to  be  designed  to  manage  a  large  number  of  potential 
applications  in  a  short  period  of  time.  Potentially,  up  to  6000  Child  Care 
Benefit  approved  long  day  care  services  could  have  applied,  although 
ultimately  1173  submissions  were  received.  Following  consideration  of 
several  options,  the  department  chose  to  proceed  with  an  email  based 
system, mainly due to timing. 
32. It  was  foreseeable  that  an  email  system  might  result  in  technical 
problems. During the application process there were differences between the 
time recorded at the department’s email gateway and the time of receipt of 
applications  in  the EYQF  inbox. There were  64 applications delayed  at  the 
gateway, with  the most  significant  time difference between an email being 
received  at  the gateway  and  released  to  the EYQF  inbox being nearly  two 
hours, affecting the placement of that application on the time receipt list by 
238 places.  Other  complexities  also  arose,  including  the  processing  of 
applications  sent  in  more  than  one  email  due  to  email  size  limits  and 
applicants making amendments to applications and resubmitting either full 
or  part  applications  (11  resubmitted  applications  were  approved  even 
though they were submitted after other applications had been excluded due 
to  the  funding  cap  being  reached)  within  the  time  allowed.  As  a 
consequence,  this  affected  the  delivery  of  EYQF  in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines to the extent that a number of applications were not processed on 
a first‐in first‐served basis.  
33. The  department’s  approach  to  assessing  grants  was  not  uniformly 
followed or documented. The CGGs  in place at  the  time  required  that entity 
staff apply sound processes and conduct granting activities  in a manner  that 
provides  for  the  equitable  treatment  of  all  applicants.  In  the  course  of 
undertaking  the  assessments,  DEEWR  waived  elements  of  the  eligibility 
criteria. Not  all of  these  amendments  to  the grant  criteria were documented 
and  applicants were not  advised  of  the  changes. Additionally,  assessors did 
not consistently apply the revised criteria. While there may be instances where 
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it  is  necessary  to  waive  or  amend  criteria  during  a  grant  process20,  in  the 
context of a program with a high  risk of over‐subscription, greater emphasis 
should  have  been  placed  on  adhering  to  the  grants  criteria  set  out  in  the 
published  guidelines  and  ensuring  that  the  assessment  process  was  clear, 
appropriately followed and documented. 
34. The  pressure  on  the  department  to  process  a  large  number  of 
applications  over  a  short  time  period  required  complete  and  accurate 
records  to  be  kept. Assessment  records  for more  than  half  of  the  services 
assessed within  the EYQF’s $300 million  funding  cap were not kept. Other 
assessment  records  were  inaccurate,  inconsistent  and  overwritten  to  the 
extent  that  no  record  of  the  initial  assessment  in  its  entirety  has  been 
maintained by the department. 
Chapter 5 – Finalisation of the Funding Process 
35. Successful applicants were advised promptly about the outcome of the 
EYQF  after  the  funding  decisions  were  made.  However,  the  advice  to  the 
majority of unsuccessful applicants and those that were not assessed due to the 
funding  cap  being  reached,  was  delayed,  as  the  then  Minister’s  office  had 
requested  that  this  information  not  be  released.  Some  unsuccessful  and  all 
non‐assessed applicants waited upwards of 11 weeks to be advised in writing 
of the final outcome of the assessment process. Other unsuccessful applicants 
received  letters  of  advice  from  the  department  detailing  reasons  for  the 
decision around two weeks after the funding decision was made. However, the 
advice  in  the  letters  regarding  applications  assessed  as  non‐compliant 
unreasonably raised applicants expectations to the extent these applicants were 
inappropriately  informed  to  re‐apply  for  funding  when  none  was  actually 
available.  Re‐submitted  applications  were  received  from  15 applicants  who 
acted on this advice. 
36. Following the grant assessments, 453 applications were deemed to have 
been  eligible  and were  offered  funding  agreements  subject  to  the  applicants 
meeting  certain  conditions.  Ultimately,  only  16 funding  agreements  were 
finalised  before  the  program  was  terminated.  The  finalisation  of  these 
agreements  occurred  one  day  before  the  2013  Federal  election  during  the 
                                                     
20  The CGGs require that departments should seek Ministerial or other appropriate authority before 
invoking provisions for waiving or amending eligibility and assessment criteria and keep appropriate 
records. Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, Second Edition, 
Financial Management Guidance No.3 June 2013, p. 62. 
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caretaker period and  included one with  the  largest provider, Goodstart Early 
Learning  which  accounted  for  $132 million.  The  department’s  approach  to 
selecting  the  funding  agreements  to  be  finalised  was  not  recorded  but  it 
subsequently  advised  the  ANAO  that  it  focused  on  finalising  these 
16 agreements as they were  the most advanced at  that point. In finalising  the 
agreements  the  Minister,  consistent  with  the  caretaker  conventions, 
corresponded  with  the  relevant  Opposition  spokesperson21,  prior  to  the 
agreements  being  finalised.  No  response  was  received  and  the  caretaker 
Minister  directed  the  department  to  proceed  with  issuing  the  funding 
agreements requesting the inclusion of termination clauses.  
Summary of entity responses 
37. The proposed audit  report was provided  to  the  (then) Department of 
Education22  and  extracts  were  provided  to  the  Department  of  the  Prime 
Minister and Cabinet  (PM&C),  the Department of Finance, United Voice,  the 
Chair of the advisory board and Goodstart Early Learning. The Department of 
Education and Training requested and received approval  from  the ANAO  to 
provide a copy of the draft report to the Department of Social Services as part 
of  the  transfer  of  responsibility  for  child  care  programs  under  the 
Administrative Arrangements Order promulgated on 23 December 2014. 
38. Formal responses were received from the Department of Education and 
Training,  and  PM&C.  Feedback  was  also  received  from  the  Department  of 
Finance, United Voice, Goodstart Early Learning and the Chair of the advisory 
board.  Summary  responses  to  the  audit  (where  provided)  are  reproduced 
below and formal responses are included at Appendix 1. 
                                                     
21  During the caretaker period, the business of government continues and ordinary matters of 
administration continue. Governments generally avoid making major policy decisions that are likely to 
commit an incoming government. However caretaker conventions provide for caretaker Ministers to 
consult with the relevant Opposition spokesperson regarding particular commitments. Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Guidance on Caretaker Conventions available at 
<http://www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/docs/caretaker_conventions.pdf> 
 [accessed on 4 December 2014]. 
22  Under the Administrative Arrangements Order promulgated on 23 December 2014, the Department of 
Education became the Department of Education and Training. 
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Department of Education and Training 
39. The Department  of Education  and Training  is  strongly  committed  to 
assisting  the  early  childhood  education  and  care  sector  attract  and  retain  a 
skilled and professional workforce. 
40. As  observed  by  the  ANAO,  the  EYQF  program  was  terminated  in 
December 2013  and  replaced  with  an  alternative  professional  development 
programme for child care educators in the long day care sector. At the time of 
responding,  5 038  long  day  care  services  were  offered  funding  under  that 
programme  to assist educators up  skill qualifications and access professional 
development activities  to assist  in meeting  the qualifications  requirements of 
the National Quality Framework. 
41. The  ANAO  acknowledges  in  its  report  DEEWR’s  experience  in 
program  implementation  and  the  prompt  establishment  of  arrangements  to 
manage  the  grant  process,  further  noting  the  challenges  imposed  by  key 
elements  of  the  policy  being  made  external  to  the  department  and  the 
exceptionally tight implementation timeframes set by government. 
42. The  audit  has  identified  several  areas  throughout  the  implementation 
process that could have benefitted from further development. The Department is 
committed  to  continuous  improvement and will  incorporate key  lessons  from 
these findings to inform the design and implementation of future programmes. 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
43. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) considers 
that  the  audit  report  provides  a  balanced  account  of  the  Department’s 
involvement in the EYQF. 
44. PM&C  notes  the  audit  report’s  conclusions  and  agrees  that  while 
decisions on policy are a matter for government, departments should provide 
frank,  comprehensive  and  timely  advice  to Ministers. Further, good Cabinet 
processes are essential to ensure strategic and coordinated policy solutions to 
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implementing  the EYQF—including  the  importance of departments providing  frank, 
comprehensive and timely advice to Ministers in relation to implementation risks and 






To  enhance  the  equity,  transparency  and  accountability 
of  future grant programs,  the ANAO  recommends  that 
the Department of Education and Training:  
(a) reinforces the obligation to manage all aspects of 
the  grant  process  in  accordance  with  the 
approved  program  guidelines  and  the 
Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines;  
(b) when  conducting  granting  activities,  adopts 
eligibility criteria which reflect  the core objective 
of  the  granting  activity  and  are  capable  of 
appropriate scrutiny and objective validation; 
(c) adheres  to documented  eligibility  criteria  in  line 
with  program  guidelines  and  closely  considers 
the  impacts  of  any  proposed  changes;  any 
changes  adopted  should  be  documented  and 
approved  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the 
Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines and 
revisions  communicated  to  applicants  and 
potential applicants; and 
(d) maintains  clear  and  complete  records  of  all 
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This  chapter  provides  background  information  on  the Early Years Quality Fund.  It 
also outlines the audit approach including its objective, criteria and methodology. 
Background  
1.1 Many Australian parents choose  to  send  their children  to  formal care 
provided  by  a  licenced  early  childhood  education  and  care  service—most 
commonly  long  day  care,  or  family  day  care.  There  are  recognised  benefits 
which accrue from higher quality child care including assistance to children in 
establishing  foundations  for  learning  and  preparation  for  subsequent 
schooling,  and  assistance  to  parents  who  wish  to  remain  in  or  re‐enter  the 
workforce. However, the cost of quality child care can affect parental decisions 
around  workforce  participation  and  the  Australian  Government  Assistant 
Minister  for Education has observed  that  ‘affordable child  care  is considered 
the  biggest  barrier  to  workforce  participation  for  women,  which  in  turn 
impacts on everything from the household budget to the national economy.’23 
1.2 The  long day  care  sector, which  cares  for more  than 500 000  children 
each  year  is  diverse,  comprised  of  large  and  small  profit  and  not‐for‐profit 
organisations providing  services  in more  than  6000  centres  across Australia. 
The  largest provider  of  services  is Goodstart Early Learning which  operates 
644 centres nationally, caring for more  than 72 500 children. In recognition of 
the diversity of the sector and the large number of children receiving services, 
the Council of Australian Governments  (COAG) agreed  in 2009  to significant 
reforms  in  the  Australian  early  childhood  education  and  care  sector.  These 
reforms set out in the National Quality Framework (NQF), a key component of 
the National Partnership on the National Quality Agenda for Early Childhood 
Education  and  Care,  replaced  the  various  licensing  and  quality  assurance 
processes that had previously existed in each state and territory. The NQF also 
introduced  minimum  staff  to  child  ratios  and  worker  qualification 
requirements. In agreeing to the reforms and in outlining a shared vision24 for 
                                                     
23  The Hon Sussan Ley MP, (Assistant Minister for Education), ‘Statement on Productivity Commission 
Inquiry into Child Care Early Childhood Learning,’ media release, Parliament House, Canberra, 
3 November 2014.  
24  COAG’s vision that by 2020 all children have the best start to life to create a better future for 
themselves and for the nation is set out in Investing in the Early Years—A National Early Childhood 
Development Strategy July 2009. 
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the  sector, COAG  recognised  that  there were  significant  supply,  recruitment 
and retention  issues  that existed and  that  in order  to achieve  its vision, steps 
would need to be taken to strengthen the child care workforce.  
1.3 The Productivity Commission in its report Early Childhood Development 
Workforce,  reflected on both  the size of  the sector and  the potential  impact of 
the  COAG  reforms.  The  Commission  noted  that  the  reforms  would 
significantly  increase  the  demand  for  workers—about  15 000  more  workers 
were likely to be required than would otherwise be the case—and the average 
level of workers’ qualifications would need to increase.25 The Commission also 
suggested  that  supply was  likely  to  respond  slowly  to  the growing demand, 
and  that  the  timeframes  for  reform  which  expected  full  implementation  by 
1 January 2014 were optimistic. The reform program was likely to be expensive 
for both governments and parents, as increased staff numbers, and the higher 
wages—anticipated  in  response  to  the  increase  in demand—would drive up 
child care costs for families. 
1.4 At the time the then government was considering reform directions, the 
trade union  representing  some  elements  of  the  child  care workforce, United 
Voice, was advocating26 for improvements in pay and conditions in the sector 
and  approached  the  government  with  a  proposal  seeking  $1.4 billion  in 
2012‐13,  (increasing  annually  to  $2.0 billion  per  year  by  2020–21)  for  a 
workforce compact similar in form to the Aged Care Compact.27 
The Early Years Quality Fund 
1.5 To progress  reforms and  respond  to  the broader wage pressures  then 
evident,  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Hon  Julia  Gillard  MP,  announced  on 
19 March 2013,  that  the  government  would  provide  $314 million28  over  five 
years to boost the quality of early childhood education and support workplace 
reform.  Of  this  funding,  $300 million  over  two  years  would  be  used  to 
                                                     
25  Productivity Commission, Early Childhood Development Workforce, November 2011, p.xxii. 
26  United Voice had been advocating since August 2008 for increased wages, better conditions and 
greater respect in the general community for child care workers as part of its Big Steps in Child care 
campaign. 
27  At the time the government was also involved in negotiations with unions and employers in other 
industries culminating in the Aged Care Workforce Compact. These negotiations were preceded by 
Fair Work Australia’s equal remuneration order in relation to certain workers employed under the 
Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Award 2010. These two initiatives influenced 
some of the policy development work around EYQF and are briefly summarised in Appendix 2. 
28  Australian Government, Budget measures: budget paper no. 2: 2013-14, pp. 123-4. 
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establish  the Early Years Quality Fund  (EYQF) with  the  intended purpose of 
providing  grants  to  long  day  care  providers  in  order  to  supplement  wage 
increases of $3 per hour  for Certificate  III qualified educators. Proportionally 
adjusted wage increases were to be made available for other child care workers 
and  diploma  and  degree  qualified  educators.  The  grants  were  to  be  made 
available to providers on a first‐in first‐served or demand‐driven basis.  
1.6 A  further  $8.2 million  over  three  years  was  provided  for  the 
administration of the fund by the then Department of Education, Employment 
and  Workplace  Relations  (DEEWR)  and  the  establishment  of  an  advisory 
board  to  oversee  the  fund’s  operations.  The  advisory  board  comprising 
individuals  from  the  sector  was  established  to  provide  advice  during  the 
implementation  and  design  phases  of  the  fund.29  The  government  also 
provided $6.2 million over four years to establish a Pay Equity Unit in the Fair 
Work  Commission  to  assist  with  data  and  research  collection,  and  provide 
specialist pay equity  information with an  initial  focus on  the early childhood 
education and care sector. 
Parliamentary interest and consideration 
1.7 The  then government determined  it would use a Special Account30  to 
establish the EYQF and on 30 May 2013, the Early Years Quality Fund Special 
Account Bill  2013  (the Bill) was  introduced  to Parliament. The Bill  attracted 
significant  stakeholder  attention  reflecting  the  level  of  public  interest  in  the 
early childhood education and care sector. A large number of submissions31 to 
the  two Parliamentary  inquiries which ensued focused on  the wage disparity 
that  was  expected  to  arise  as  only  a  proportion  of  the  early  childhood 
education and care sector would be eligible  to receive EYQF funds. Concerns 
were raised with respect to the amount of funds allocated—$300 million over 
two years was  considered  insufficient  to provide wage  increases  for all  long 
                                                     
29  The advisory board’s role as set out in its terms of reference included providing advice on: eligibility 
criteria; equitable funding distribution; application and assessment processes; conditionality of funding; 
monitoring and reporting to ensure transparency and compliance; and engagement and 
communication with the sector.  
30  A Special Account is a mechanism used to record amounts in the Consolidated Revenue Fund that 
are appropriated for specified purposes. Special Accounts are used for a variety of purposes including 
delivering certain government regulatory and business activities, accounting for trust money, 
segregating money for activities that the Commonwealth funds jointly with other parties, and setting 
aside funds for medium to long-term government programs. 
31  The House of Representatives inquiry received 99 submissions and the Senate inquiry received 
submissions from 508 individuals and organisations. 
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day  care educators—and  the  impact on  the workforce when  funding  ceased. 
The first‐in first‐served approach also drew concern from small providers and 
sector representative bodies who considered that the approach would lock out 
smaller  providers  as  they  did  not  have  the  resources  of  larger  providers  to 
apply  for  funds  quickly.  The  Bill  was  passed  without  amendment  by  both 
Houses  of  Parliament  on  28 June 2013.  In  his  second  reading  speech  on  the 
matter, the then Minister32 noted there was more to be done within the sector 
to ‘attract and retain qualified, respected educators who are being remunerated 
in  a way  that  shows  their  value  to  the Australian  society  and  the  future  of 
Australian children.’  
1.8 The Early Years Quality Fund Special Account Act 2013 came  into effect 
on 1 July 2013, with  the object of  improving quality outcomes  for children  in 
early childhood education and care services, by enhancing professionalism  in 
the  sector,  including  through  improved  attraction  and  retention  of  a  skilled 
and  professional  workforce.  The  Special  Accountʹs  use  was  restricted  to 
remuneration and other employment related costs and expenses. The account 
was  credited  with  $135 million  on  commencement  (1 July 2013),  with  the 
remaining $165 million to be credited on 1 July 2014. 
1.9 The provision of grants  is a means commonly used by  the Australian 
Government  to  collaborate  with  third  parties  in  the  delivery  of  services  in 
support of policy objectives. The grants policy framework that was in place at 
the  time  that  the  funding  rounds  were  completed  included  the  Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), Financial Management and 
Accountability Regulations  1997  (FMA Regulations)  and  the Commonwealth 
Grants Guidelines  (CGGs). The  framework  changed after  the  funding  round 
was completed, with  the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 
2013  (PGPA  Act)  taking  effect  from  1  July  2014  and  the  issuing  of  the 
Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines (CGRGs) to replace the CGGs.  
1.10 The  CGGs  included  several  mandatory  requirements  in  relation  to 
decision  making  by  Ministers  and  reporting,  as  well  as  a  range  of  better 
practice  principles  to  guide  government  entities  in  their  approach  to  grants 
administration.  These  same  requirements  are  reflected  in  the  CGRGs.  Since 
                                                     
32  Minister for School Education, Early Childhood and Youth, The Hon Peter Garrett MP, Second 
Reading speech; the Early Years Special Account Bill 2013, 25 June 2013. 
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Early Years Quality Fund grants 
1.11 In  agreeing  to  the  EYQF,  the  then  government  sought  to  achieve 
outcomes quickly, setting a date for the disbursement of the grants of 1 July 2013. 
As a result, DEEWR had just over three months to put in place all the necessary 
arrangements  to  implement  the  program,  including  conducting  the  grants 
assessment process. As noted  in paragraph 1.5,  the government also adopted a 




a  number  of  different  approaches  to  awarding  grants,  including  through 
demand‐driven processes under which applications that satisfy stated eligibility 
criteria receive funding, up to the limit of available appropriations.  
1.12 Access  to  the  EYQF  was  through  an  email  application  process  using 
forms provided on  the departmentʹs website. To apply  for  funding, applicants 
were  required  to  download  and  complete  application  forms  and  lodge  them 




the proposed  funding,  successful providers  then needed  to  take  steps  to meet 
the  conditions  in  the  offer  including  putting  in  place  or  varying  enterprise 
agreements  to  reflect  the  agreed  EYQF  wage  schedule.  In  late  August 2013, 
44 providers  had  met  the  conditions  of  offer,  and  funding  agreements  were 
progressed for 16 of these prior to the 2013 Federal election. These 16 agreements 
provided for the payment of grants totalling $137 million. 
Review of the Early Years Quality Fund 
1.13 On  coming  into  office  in  September 2013,  the  new  government 
commissioned  PricewaterhouseCoopers  Australia  to  conduct  a  Ministerial 
                                                     
33  The first version of the ANAO Better Practice Guide on Grants Administration was published in 1994, 
and was updated in 1997, 2002, 2010 and 2013. 
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review  of  the  EYQF.  In  response  to  the  review  report34,  the  government 
replaced  the EYQF with  a new professional development program  for  child 
care  educators. The new program  is directed  towards  assisting  educators  in 
long day care services to meet the qualification requirements of the NQF and 
improving practice to ensure quality outcomes for children.  
1.14 EYQF  funding  agreements  were  renegotiated  with  funding  levels 
payable  to  the 16 providers reduced. As at 30 June 2014,  ten months after  the 
original  funding agreements were signed, a  total of $62.5 million was paid  to 
these  16 providers  of  which  $51.3 million  was  for  wages,  $4.9 million  for 
on‐costs  and  $6.3 million  for professional development. Conditional  funding 
offers for the remaining applications (made in August 2013) were revoked on 
11 October 2013.  
1.15 The  key  events  in  the  development  of  the  EYQF  are  summarised  in 
Table 1.1. 
                                                     
34  The final report on the Ministerial review was publicly released on 10 December 2013. 
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Table 1.1: Early Years Quality Fund timeline 
Date Action 
19 March 2013 Letter from the Minister for School Education, Early Childhood & Youth 
to the Prime Minister seeking authority to establish the EYQF. 
Letter from the Prime Minister to the Minister granting authority for the 
EYQF. 
Department issues FAQ guidance on its website. 
EYQF details posted by United Voice to its Big Steps Campaign 
Facebook page. 
24 May 2013 EYQF advisory board appointed. 
30 May 2013 EYQF Special Account Bill 2013 introduced to Parliament. 
6 June 2013 1st advisory board meeting. 
14 June 2013 2nd advisory board meeting. 
17 June 2013 Senate Inquiry into the Bill reports. 
19 June 2013 House of Representatives Inquiry into the Bill reports. 
3rd advisory board meeting. 
27-28 June 2013 4th advisory board meeting. 
28 June 2013 EYQF Special Account Bill 2013 passed by both Houses of Parliament. 
19 July 2013 Program guidelines issued on DEEWR website and advice distributed 
to long day care service providers. 
23 July 2013 Application process for EYQF opened at 11am AEST. 
Large provider funding pool cap reached by 1.30pm AEST 
Small provider funding pool cap reached by 12 midnight AEST.35 
27 July 2013 List of providers receiving funding finalised for approval. 
Early August 2013 Conditional offers of funding made for 453 successful applications. 
6 September 2013 Funding agreements executed with 12 providers (4 others were signed 
by the Commonwealth and subsequently considered executed). 
7 September 2013 Federal election. 
10 December 2013 Review report released. 




35  These times represent the point at which the final applications were received to reach the cap. 
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Request for review by the Auditor-General 
1.16 The  government’s  review  raised  a  number  of  concerns  about  the 
manner  in which  the EYQF had been  implemented. Following  the  release of 
the review on 10 December 2013, Mr Alex Hawke MP wrote in December 2013 





implementation  and  operation  of  the  EYQF  against  the  requirements  of  the 
Early  Years  Quality  Fund  Special  Account  Act  2013  and  the  Commonwealth 
grants administration framework. 
Scope 
1.18 The ANAO  focused on  the key program elements of  the EYQF,  from 
the  establishment  of  the  fund  and  the  design  and  conduct  of  the  funding 
round,  and  its  ongoing  operation  and  management.  The  main  focus  of  the 





1.19 To  conclude  against  the  audit  objective,  the  ANAO  adopted  the 
following high level criteria: 
 program  planning  and  implementation  complied  with  the  legal 
framework,  appropriately  considered  risks  and  was  consistent  with  the 
EYQF policy intent; and 
 grants  administration  was  undertaken  in  an  equitable  and  transparent 
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relevant  stakeholders,  including  successful  and  unsuccessful  grant 
applicants and members of the advisory board; and 
 examined a sample of 759 grant submissions. This  included a detailed 
examination  of  the  grant  assessments  for  more  than  490  distinct 
applications which were approved for funding, assessed as compliant, 
as non‐compliant or as ineligible.  
1.21 The  EYQF  was  implemented  by  the  Department  of  Education, 
Employment  and  Workplace  Relations  (DEEWR)  and,  following  the  2013 
Federal election, the Department of Education. For ease of reading, this report 
refers  to  DEEWR,  unless  otherwise  noted.  Under  the  Administrative 
Arrangements  Order  promulgated  on  23 December 2014,  the  Department  of 
Education  became  the  Department  of  Education  and  Training,  and  early 
childhood  programs  were  transferred  to  the  Department  of  Social  Services 
(DSS).36 The Department of  the Prime Minister and Cabinet  (PM&C) and  the 




Audit report structure  
1.23 The structure of the report is outlined in Table 1.2 below. 
                                                     
36  As the EYQF had been terminated in 2013, DSS did not have any role in its implementation. 
  
ANAO Report No.23 2014–15 
Administration of the Early Years Quality Fund 
 
42 
Table 1.2: Report structure 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 
Establishment of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 
This chapter examines the policy development process 
and establishment of the $300 million Early Years 
Quality Fund and the provision of advice to government 
at various stages. 
Chapter 3 
Implementation of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 
This chapter considers the department’s approach to 
implementing the Early Years Quality Fund with a focus 
on engagement with the sector and management of key 
risks to program access. 
Chapter 4 
Access to the Program and 
Assessment Outcomes 
This chapter examines the department’s processes for 
submitting and assessing applications, the 
recommendation to the delegate and the final funding 
decision. 
Chapter 5 
Finalisation of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 
This chapter examines the advice the department 
provided to applicants after the funding decision was 
made, the processes followed in developing the funding 
agreements during the caretaker period, and 
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2. Establishment of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 









appropriately  supported  and  well  informed.  Successful  implementation  of 
policy  initiatives  requires  early,  informed  and  systematic  consideration  of 
implementation issues. 
2.2 The ANAO examined the development of the EYQF policy with a focus 
on  the  advice  that  was  provided  to  Ministers  and  the  extent  to  which 
implementation was considered in policy development. 





EYQF  policy  arose  from  negotiations  between  stakeholders  and  the 
government,  it  was  preceded  by  broader  policy  considerations  and 
departmental  advice  in  relation  to  issues  highlighted  in  the  Productivity 
Commission’s  2011  report  into  the  Early  Childhood  Workforce.38  The 
government considered a number of options  in preparing  its  response  to  the 
Productivity  Commission  report.  As  part  of  this  consideration  DEEWR 
                                                     
37  The APS Code of Conduct values include responsiveness through providing frank, honest, 
comprehensive, accurate and timely advice to the government and in implementing the government's 
policies and programs. <http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/aps-values-and-
code-of-conduct/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice> [accessed on 31 October 2014]. 
38  Productivity Commission, Early Childhood Development Workforce, November 2011. 
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proposed  options  involved  a  compact  with  the  child  care  sector  to  address 
wage matters in return for restraining fee increases. At that time (late 2012), the 
department  was  working  on  a  number  of  options  including  assumptions 
which  ranged  from  $195 million  over  three  years  for  a  one  per  cent  wage 
increase  (or  $6  per  week  for  an  average  full  time  educator),  through  to 
$978 million over  three years  for a  five per cent wage  increase, which would 
equate to $30 per week.  
2.4  The Prime Minister’s Office  (PMO)  requested  the Department  of  the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet  (PM&C)  to provide a summary of processes  that 
would be required for: 
 An  application  to  Fair  Work  Australia  for  an  equal  remuneration 
order—the  advice  recognised  that  minimum  wage  setting  was  the 
responsibility  of  industrial  tribunals,  which  are  separate  from 
government; 
 A  low‐paid  bargaining  authorisation,  which  would  require  multiple 
employers to bargain for a multi‐enterprise agreement; and 
 A  workforce  compact  between  government,  union  and  business 
representatives. 
2.5 PM&C  also  advised  that  there  were  implementation  risks  and 
difficulties with each of  the options  set out at paragraph 2.4.  In particular, a 
workforce compact was identified as a difficult option for the early childhood 
sector as the Commonwealth provided very little direct funding to employers. 
Most  government  funding  in  the  sector  is  provided  directly  to  families39 
through  the Child Care Rebate  (CCR)  and Child Care Benefit  (CCB), which 
cumulatively total around $5 billion per annum. 
Developing the child care workforce strategy 
2.6 Governments generally have several policy development options open to 
them on  significant  issues,  including  the development of Cabinet  submissions 
for  consideration  by  Cabinet  or,  less  frequently,  by  correspondence  between 
                                                     
39  652 000 families received assistance in that year. Source: Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-14, 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Portfolio p. 39. 
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Ministers  and  the Prime Minister. The  advantage  of  a Cabinet  submission  is 
that  it  can  provide  for  structured  consideration  of  risks,  timelines  and 
resourcing  from  a  range  of  perspectives,  namely  those  of Cabinet Ministers 
and  their departments. In  the case of  the EYQF,  the government chose not  to 
proceed through a Cabinet process. Instead, the policy was largely developed 
between the offices of the Finance Minister, Treasurer and the Prime Minister, 
as  well  as  the  offices  of  the  Minister  for  Education,  the  Minister  for  Early 
Childhood  and  Child  Care,  and  the  Parliamentary  Secretary  for  School 
Education  and  Workplace  Relations.  The  policy  was  subsequently  settled 




later  in  January 2013,  the  development  of  the  strategy  was  overtaken  by 
negotiations  between  United  Voice  and  Ministers’  advisers.  While  this 
development  was  driven  by  advisers,  staff  in  each  of  the  Ministers’  offices 




represented  a  hybrid  approach  of  options  previously  considered  in  the 
Ministers’  offices  to  address  the  United  Voice  child  care  campaign  and 
comprised a proposal for a Child Care Workforce Strategy (including Short Term 
Assistance  for Child Care Sector: Expanded Child Care Flexibility Trial). The 
child care workforce strategy  (CCWS) was significant  in  that  it  identified  the 
key  policy  parameters  for  the  EYQF  including  the  provision  of  grants  on  a 
‘first‐in first‐served’ basis until the available funding was committed.40  
2.9 The strategy also envisaged that around 30 per cent of the long day care 
sector would be  involved  in  a  compact between government  and  employers 
through wage  supplementation  to  be delivered  through  a  grant  program  to 
eligible providers. The key features of the proposal were: 
                                                     
40  Although not specifically noted or referenced in the CCWS, the CGGs provided for a number of 
different approaches to awarding grants including through ‘demand-driven’ processes under which 
applications that satisfied stated eligibility criteria received funding, up to the limited of available 
appropriations. 
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 access  to grants was  to be  restricted  to  long day  care providers who 
were approved for the purposes of the Child Care Benefit; 
 applications were to be subject to a number of conditions including; 
 a practical  commitment  to  the  implementation of  the National 
Quality  Framework  (NQF),  including  a  detailed  plan  to meet 
the workforce qualification  requirements  commencing  in 2014, 
and  evidence  of  support  for  the  NQF  by  a  majority  of 
permanent employees; 
 approval  of  an  enterprise  agreement  containing  the  approved 





running cost  increases  (and no  fee  increases resulting  from  the 
increase in wages arising from the operation of the EYQF); and 
 a preparedness to meet specified reporting requirements. 
Provision of advice by relevant departments 
2.10 Advice  on  the  policy  under  negotiation was  sought  from  the  central 
agencies,  the Departments of Finance, Treasury and PM&C, as  it developed. 
As the entity that would have responsibility for implementation of the EYQF, 
DEEWR’s  involvement  in  the  provision  of  advice  in  the  initial  stages  was 
largely limited to contributing to advice being prepared by central agencies. 
2.11 Early  in 2013 central agencies provided  joint advice to their respective 
Ministers  highlighting  key  issues—including  cost,  scope,  eligibility  and 
timing—for consideration prior to any decisions being taken. In particular the 
three central agencies recommended that Ministers note: 
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the  increases payable  to workers  covered by  the Aged Care Compact or  the 
SACS decision. 
2.12 A  key  observation  in  the  advice  was  that  providing  wage 
supplementation  directly  to  employers  would  change  the  nature  of  the 
government’s  involvement  with  the  sector.  As  a  result,  the  brief  identified  a 
number of key issues for consideration. A summary of these key issues is below. 
The scope and cost of the proposed compact  
2.13 The proposal  to provide a wage  increase  to a sub‐set of  the  long day 
care workforce was considered  to risk criticism  from  the majority of  the  long 
day care workforce who would not receive the proposed increase. Employees 
covered by an enterprise agreement were already likely to be being paid above 
award  rates. This proposal  could  therefore be  seen  to benefit 14 500 workers 
who  may  already  be  in  receipt  of  above  award  rates,  while  providing  no 
increase to 50 000 workers who were not. 
2.14 The  (then)  proposed  $5  per  hour42  wage  supplementation  would 
represent  an  increase  of  approximately  25‐30 per cent  above  (then)  current 
hourly rates.43 While  the amount of  the  increase was consistent with  the  total 
increase  awarded  by  the  Fair  Work  Commission  (FWC)  to  SACS  workers, 
SACS increases were being phased in over eight years. The proposed increases 
were  also  considerably  larger  than  those  provided  under  the  Aged  Care 
Workforce Compact of $0.46 per hour, of which the government was funding 
$0.18 per hour in the first year.  
2.15 Central  agencies  observed  that  the  provision  of  Commonwealth 
supplementation for increases in excess of 25 per cent of current wages ahead of 
any consideration of a wage case by the FWC (which had not been prepared at 
that  time),  would  raise  expectations  of  continued  Commonwealth 
                                                     
41  Additional details about the Social and Community Services (SACS) equal remuneration case and the 
Aged Care Workforce Compact are in Appendix 2. 
42  Initially, the proposed wage increase was $5.00 per hour, later settled at $3.00 per hour. 
43  The 2010 Children Services Award and the Education Services (Teachers) Award Rates, updated to 
2012. Available at <https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/documents/modern_awards/pdf/ 
MA000120.pdf> [accessed on 13 August 2014]. 
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supplementation  for all child care  centres after any decision by  the FWC. The 
estimated cost of this would be in the order of $800 to $900 million per annum. 
In  the view of  the central agencies, a  lower wage rise over a  larger number of 
providers could have assisted with mitigating this risk. 
2.16 Restricting  the  proposed  compact  to  a  relatively  small  number  of 
providers was considered  likely to have a significant market distortion effect, 
with  those  not  eligible  for  wage  assistance  likely  to  experience  increased 
difficulty  in  attracting  and  retaining qualified  staff. This would put upward 
pressure  on  fees  for  those  providers, which would  in  turn  flow  through  to 
increased costs for parents. 
Timing 
2.17 The  development  of  a  wage  compact  between  the  government, 
participating  child  care  providers  and  United  Voice  was  noted  to  be  very 
challenging  to  implement  and  make  payments  from  1 August 2013.  Before 
negotiations on a compact could commence,  the scope of  the compact would 
need  to be determined  and  if  it was  restricted  to  a  sub‐set of  long day  care 




2.18 The  brief  also  presented  alternative  longer‐term  options  for  the 
Minister’s  consideration  that  central  agencies  felt  would  more  closely  align 
with  the  Commonwealthʹs  existing  support  for  child  care  and  be  less 
distortionary to the market. These included: 
(a) Introduction of a loading (approximately 5 per cent) on to the Child Care 
Benefit  to  help  break  the  nexus  between  wage  cases  and  wage 
supplementation.  Providers would  be  able  to  increase  fees  to  support 
wage and training requirements but with an offset to parents targeted at 
low to medium income earners.  
(b) Increase  the  level of  the Child Care Rebate  ‐ Providers would be able  to 
increase fees to support wage and training requirements but without any 
targeting  to parents on  low  to medium  incomes, although  it was noted 
that restriction of Child Care Rebate increases to long day care only would 
be more difficult to justify and may also introduce market distortions. 
Establishment of the Early Years Quality Fund 
 
ANAO Report No.23 2014–15 





Finance Minister’s office with an  indicative  costing assessment  for  the EYQF 
which  set  out  several  additional  assumptions,  including  that  the  advisory 
board  would  need  to  be  established  and  meet  immediately  as  it  would  be 
responsible  for  the  implementation  plan.  The  most  significant  of  the 
assumptions  set  out  in  the  Finance  costing  was  that  applications  would  be 
based on a  first‐in  first‐served basis, which was a  feature  identified  in policy 
papers prepared by ministerial advisers, as noted in paragraph 2.8. Finance has 
advised  that  the  assumption  was  made  on  the  basis  of  the  timetable 
established by the policy, which called for grant payments to be available and 
commence from 1 July 2013. 
Approach to grant allocation 
2.20 The CGG’s  indicate  that  the  key  factors which  should  be  considered 
when determining  the  type of granting approach  include  the objective of  the 
granting activity; the  likely number and type of application; the nature of the 
grants;  the  value  of  the  grants;  and  the  need  for  timeliness  and 
cost‐effectiveness  in  the  decision‐making  process  while  maintaining  rigour, 
equity  and  accountability.45  Additionally,  the  CGGs  state  that  competitive, 
merit‐based  selection  processes  should  be  used  to  allocate  grants,  unless 
specifically  agreed  otherwise  by  a  Minister,  chief  executive  or  delegate.  As 
discussed at paragraph 2.8, the determination of the first‐in first‐served grant 
selection process was not well documented  in  the development of EYQF.  In 




2.21 There  are  advantages  and  disadvantages  to  both  merit‐based  and 
demand‐driven granting activities. Drawbacks of  the  latter approach  include 
that  it  is  likely  to  result  in  applications  being  assessed  in  relative  isolation, 
                                                     
44  This indicative costing was developed in consultation with DEEWR particularly with respect to 
consideration of DEEWR’s costs associated with EYQF’s implementation. 
45  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines – Policies and Principles 
for Grants Administration, Financial Management Guidance No. 3, Canberra, June 2013 (2nd Edition) 
p. 61. 
46  Ibid. p. 61. 
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potentially making  it more difficult  to  ensure  there  are  consistent processes, 
standards  and  interpretations  of  the  grant  guidelines  applied  in  the 
decision‐making process.47 A merit‐based approach offers advantages such as a 
more transparent and reliable method of selecting successful applicants. 
2.22 The  nature  of  the  granting  activity  will  affect  the  content  of  the 
program  guidelines.  While  demand‐driven  granting  activities  can  be  an 
efficient means of providing intended recipients with funding, the potential for 
oversubscription of the EYQF was very high. Accordingly, an assessment of its 
implications  for  the  eligibility  criteria  and  how  the  program  would  be 
managed when the available funds were exhausted was desirably required in 
the policy design phase of the program. Such an assessment could have been 
used  to appropriately  inform  the government on matters such as whether or 
not a demand‐driven program was the most appropriate or a maximum grant 
limit  should  be  applied.  As  a  department  experienced  in  implementation, 
DEEWR  was  well  positioned  to  consider  the  risks  and  benefits  of  different 
approaches.  In  the  early  policy  development  stage,  the  department  did 
contribute advice  in  relation  to  the workplace  relations aspects of  the policy. 
Although,  as  the  agency  that would  be  responsible  for  implementation,  the 
department did not and was not requested, to provide advice in relation to the 
demand‐driven  nature  of  the  grant  activity  in  briefings  prepared  by  central 
agencies.  There  was  a  further  opportunity  for  DEEWR  to  address 
implementation matters, when developing correspondence for the Minister on 




Policy approval and announcement 
2.23 Once  the  agreement had been  reached between Ministers  around  the 
policy parameters, DEEWR was  requested  by  the Prime Minister’s Office  to 
prepare  correspondence  for  the  Minister  for  School  Education,  Early 
Childhood and Youth, seeking policy authority from the Prime Minister for the 
EYQF. In addition to preparing the draft correspondence, a department would 
generally  be  expected  to  advise  its  Minister,  including  in  respect  of  any 
                                                     
47  ANAO Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration – Better Practice Guide December 2013, 
Section 4.2.1 p. 33. 
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significant risks  to  the policy design or  implementation, and opportunities  to 
mitigate  those risks  in  the event  the government determined  to proceed with 
the proposal. Although the department held concerns around some aspects of 
the  proposal  at  this  time,  including  around  the  meaning  of  the  first‐in 
first‐served  approach  to  grants,  the  department  elected  not  to  provide  the 
Minister with any accompanying advice on the EYQF proposal. 
2.24 The Prime Minister agreed  to  the package of measures  set out  in  the 
Minister’s letter on 19 March 201348, thereby providing policy authority for the 
EYQF. The Prime Minister’s  letter also  requested an  implementation plan be 
provided  (to  the  Prime  Minister)  by  8 April 2013,  which  was  to  include 
timeframes  for  the  establishment  of  the  EYQF  advisory  board,  and 
development  of  its  advice  ahead  of  a  1 July 2013  implementation  date  and 
advice on how the EYQF would be accessed by a range of providers. 
Additional advice to Ministers 
2.25 From  an  implementation  perspective  DEEWR  regarded  the  first‐in 
first‐served process  (which had been agreed by government), as problematic, 
recognising  the  challenges  associated  with  this  approach.  The  department 
provided  a  brief  to  the Minister  for  School  Education  Early Childhood  and 





 advice  that  if on‐costs were  to be  included  in  the grants,  these should 
be on a sliding scale; and 
 a suggestion  that grant  funding should only be available  for qualified 




briefing  to  the Minister for Education, advisers  in  the Prime Minister’s Office 
did not accept  the alternative options outlined above. The  response  from  the 
                                                     
48  This was the same day that the Minister signed the correspondence to the Prime Minister. 
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timeframe  implications,  conducting  a  comparative  merit‐based  assessment 
process would produce a better policy outcome and would be considered by 
the sector as being more equitable and  transparent  than a  first‐in  first‐served 
process. There was no direct response to this suggestion. 
Inherent risks 
2.28 There were  inherent risks  that derived  from  the  fact  that DEEWR did 
not  provide  advice  on  program  implementation  during  the  policy 
development process  for EYQF. DEEWR’s key opportunities  to  influence  the 
development of EYQF policy prior  to  its agreement were  twofold:  firstly  the 
input into advice provided by the central agencies; and secondly in preparing 
correspondence  for  its  Minister,  however,  the  department  elected  not  to 




later  raised  by DEEWR,  did  not  gain  traction with ministerial  advisers  and 
were  not  accommodated  before  the  program  guidelines  were  released.  The 
development of the program guidelines is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
                                                     
49  Goodstart Early Learning operates 644 centres caring for more than 72 500 children and employs 
more than 13 000 staff. Source: Goodstart Early Learning 2014 Annual Report 30 June 2014, 
available at <http://www.goodstart.org.au/GoodStart/media/GoodStart/PDFs/Annual%20reports/ 
Goodstart-2014-Annual-Report-2014.pdf?ext=.pdf>. 
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2.29 Policy development  takes a number of different  forms. Some policies 
can be developed and implemented with long lead times while others must be 
developed and implemented quickly. A key element of all policy development 
is  the  need  to  give  early,  informed  and  systematic  consideration  of 
implementation  issues.  Involvement  of  implementing  entities  and  the 
provision  of  advice  by  those  entities  at  appropriate  stages  of  the  policy 
development  process  helps  reduce  subsequent  implementation  risks.  The 
advantage  of  a  Cabinet  submission  is  that  it  can  provide  for  structured 
consideration of risks,  timelines and resourcing  from a range of perspectives, 
namely  those  of Cabinet Ministers  and  their  departments. However,  in  this 
instance,  the  government  elected  to  manage  the  proposal  through 
correspondence between Ministers and the Prime Minister. 
2.30 Important  details  around  the  operation  of  the  grant  selection  process 
were decided by government as part of the policy announced on 19 March 2013, 
including  that  the  grants  were  to  be  made  available  to  providers  on  a 
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3. Implementation of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 





of  the  key  responsibilities  of  government  entities.  In  recent  years  there  has 
been  an  increasing  focus  on,  and  a  community  expectation  of,  sound policy 
implementation and the seamless delivery of government policies.50 Successful 
implementation  requires  early,  informed  and  systematic  consideration  of 
issues as they arise throughout implementation.  
3.2 Following  the  government’s  decision  to  proceed  with  the  EYQF, 
DEEWR was responsible for developing and implementing the administrative 
arrangements  for  the program. As noted  in paragraph 2.28,  the design of  the 
EYQF  policy  contained  inherent  risks  (the  funding  constraints,  the  first‐in 
first‐served  approach  and  the  short  timeframe).  Implementing  the  program 
would  require  a  concerted  effort  on  DEEWR’s  part  to  meet  government’s 
timing expectations and ensure equity of access  to  the program.51 The EYQF 
advisory board also had an  important  role  in  the program’s  implementation, 
through  the provision of  advice  to  the department on how grants would be 
accessed  by  a  range  of  providers  and  direction  in  the  development  of  the 
program guidelines.  
3.3 As EYQF  funding was provided on a  first‐in  first‐served basis,  it was 
critical that applicants could easily understand the details of the program, how 
to  apply  and  how  their  application  would  be  assessed  against  other 
applications.  This  would  avoid  potential  costs  to  applicants  associated  with 
                                                     
50  The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Australian National Audit Office, 
October 2014, Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives Better Practice Guide, p. 3  
51  The department was provided with an additional $8 million to administer the EYQF over a three year 
period in view of the likely volume of grant applications requiring assessment, rapid roll out and 
requirement for ongoing detailed monitoring at service level. A portion of this allocation was to provide 
for the establishment and running costs of the EYQF advisory board with the remainder of the funding 
for the set up and administration of the fund.  
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Engagement with stakeholders 





Stakeholder reaction to the Early Years Quality Fund 
announcement 
3.6 The EYQF was announced by relevant Ministers54 when meeting with 
the  National  Children’s  Services  Forum  (NCSF),  in  Canberra.  The  initial 
reaction  of  the  sector  to  the  EYQF  was  mixed.  While  some  stakeholders 
supported the program, others were strongly opposed to it. The two main peak 
bodies,  Early  Childhood  Australia  (ECA)  and  the  Australian  Childcare 
Alliance (ACA) both made separate representations to the Minister for School 
Education Early Childhood  and Youth  advocating  for  reconsideration of  the 
program  and policy parameters.55 Both bodies distributed  information  about 
the  merits  of  the  EYQF  and  their  respective  position  to  their  members, 
educators and families with children attending child care centres. United Voice 
was  also  active  in  promoting  the  program  and  engaged  in  a  grass  roots 
campaign to recruit educators into the union and offered child care providers 
with  assistance  to  develop  enterprise  agreements  in  preparation  for  EYQF 
                                                     
52  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, June 2013, 
paragraph 8.7. 
53  The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Australian National Audit Office, October 
2014, Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives Better Practice Guide, pp. 35-36. 
54  Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, the (then) Minister for School Education Early 
Childhood and Youth, and the (then) Minister for Early Childhood and Child Care. 
55  The two peak bodies were not in agreement around how the program might be adjusted, for example 
ACA proposed that the available funding be distributed equality amongst childhood educators so that 
every worker received an additional $1 an hour, while the ECA was concerned that a $1 per hour 
increase would not achieve professional wages for early childhood educators. 
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grants.  A  significant  number  of  providers  took  up  the  union’s  offer  for 
assistance  and  started  negotiations  for  entering  into  enterprise  agreements 
with their workers, in anticipation of the EYQF grants process commencing.  
Advisory board’s role 
3.7 The  formation  of  the  EYQF  advisory  board  was  included  in  the 
announcement  of  the  EYQF  on  19 March 2013,  and  approved  by  the  (then) 
Prime Minister on the same day. Board membership was  initially  intended to 
be  finalised by 3 April 2013 after  formal approval by  the  (then) Minister and 
(then) Prime Minister. However, there were delays in both the Minister’s office 
and  the  Prime  Minister’s  office  and  the  final  list  of  candidates  was  not 
approved  until  24 May 2013.  The  announcement  of  the  membership  of  the 
advisory board and its terms of reference also met with a mixed reaction from 
the peak bodies and other stakeholders.  Initially,  the advisory board’s  role—
advising on the content and operation of the EYQF program guidelines—was 
intended  to  provide members with  an  opportunity  to  directly  influence  the 
program settings. At its first meeting in June 2013, the board considered its role 
in relation to communication with the sector, and resolved to amend its charter 




of  the  decisions  made  at  board  meetings.  However,  other  than  the  two 
communiques released by the board, no other information was communicated 
to the sector by the advisory board. 
3.8 Members of advisory boards are generally selected  for  their specialist 
knowledge  and  may  include  stakeholders  sourced  from  industry,  the 
community or special  interest groups. While  there are obvious advantages  in 
appointing qualified or highly experienced members,  their expertise can also 
present conflicts of  interest risks for an entity. The department recommended 
to  the  Minister  that,  with  one  exception,  early  childhood  employer  and 
employee  organisations  should  not  be  invited  to  join  the  board  to  avoid 
perceived  or  real  conflicts  of  interest.56  However,  in  seeking  the  Prime 
Minister’s  agreement  to  the  advisory  board  appointments,  the  Minister 
                                                     
56  Early Childhood Australia (ECA) which is a peak national, non-profit, non-government organisation 
that advocates for young children and quality outcomes in the early childhood sector. 
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which  included employer and employee organisations, would be  required  to 
remove  themselves  from  discussions  on  the  development  of  funding 
agreements, or negotiating enterprise agreements in their own organisations.  
3.9 The  department  decided  that  it  would  seek  probity  advice  on  an  as 
required  basis,  and  a  probity  adviser  was  retained  initially  to  prepare  and 
deliver a probity briefing at an advisory board meeting, and  reviewing board 
documents.  The  scope  of  the  initial  probity  engagement  would  prove  to  be 
insufficient for the department’s needs, and at the request of the advisory board 
chair,  it  was  agreed  that  the  probity  adviser  should  attend  all  of  the  board 







share  information  or  knowledge  from  the  meetings  with  their  organisations, 
particularly  those organisations  that were applying  for  funding or represented 
the  union.  The  probity  adviser  signed  off  on  the  process,  indicating  that  the 
board  meetings  had  been  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  advisory  board 
charter and the policies of the Commonwealth.  
DEEWR’s communication with the sector 
3.10 DEEWR developed a communication plan to raise awareness of EYQF 
among  child  care  providers  and  the  general  public.  In  addition  to  the 
communication activities of the advisory board, the plan set out various other 
communication channels and activities including sector consultations, website 
promotion,  providing  information  for  Industry/Sector  publications, 
E‐newsletters,  media  releases,  email  updates  through  the  Child  Care 
Management  System  (CCMS)  and  EYQF  subscriber  lists,  and  Frequently 
Asked Questions  (FAQs) posted  to  the department’s website.  In practice,  the 
actions arising from the plan were limited. FAQs on the EYQF web page were 
updated between the announcement of the program in March and the issuing 
of program guidelines  in  July 2013, however,  the department provided  little 
other information to the sector and no public consultations were held.  
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3.11 In  addition,  where  the  department  was  aware  of  information  being 
provided to stakeholders by United Voice, the department’s response did not 
extend to providing more detailed information about arrangements or taking a 
more  active  approach  to  its  communications.  In  the  weeks  following  the 
announcement  of  the  EYQF,  the  Minister  and  the  department  received 
correspondence  in  relation  to  information  being  provided  by  United  Voice. 
The  department  responded  to  individual  enquiries  on  the  Minister’s  behalf 
and wrote to United Voice requesting that its representatives note the updated 
FAQs on  the EYQF website so  that consistent  information could be provided 
on the program. 
3.12 At a National Children Services Forum on 2 July 2013, there was broad 
opposition  to  the  fund.  In  briefing  the  Minister  with  respect  to  the  forum, 
DEEWR advised  that many members of  the  forum had  raised concern at  the 
lack of consultation with the sector about such a significant policy, prior to its 
announcement.  The  department  did  not  however,  propose  any  additional 
communication activities to assist in remedying the issue. 
Management of key risks to program access  
3.13 Successful  program  implementation  relies  on  the  identification  and 
management of key risks.  Implementation  initiatives  that  involve other parties 
can  increase  the  complexity  of  risk  management.57  Regardless  of  the 
involvement of other parties, there remains an underlying reality that Australian 
Government  entities  ultimately  retain  responsibility  for  delivering  initiatives 
and for contingency plans in the event of risks materialising.58 In this context the 
ANAO  examined  the  department’s  treatment  of  key  implementation  risks 
including  the  recommendations  from  the  advisory board,  the development of 
the wages schedule and the ease of use of the program guidelines. 
Advisory board recommendations 
3.14 In  keeping  with  its  terms  of  reference,  the  advisory  board  made  a 
number of  recommendations  to  the department on how  the grants would be 
accessed  by  a  range  of  providers.  These  recommendations  were  made  in 
response  to  issues  which  the  board  identified  during  its  deliberations, 
                                                     
57  The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Australian National Audit Office, October 
2014, Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives Better Practice Guide, p. 32 
58  Ibid. p. 33 
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including:  the application  for grants on a  service by  service basis which was 
considered  likely  to  create  a  red‐tape  burden  on  providers  with  multiple 





capped  and  the  parameters  for  the  wage  increase  meant  that  about 
60‐70 per cent of long day care services would not be assisted. The issues and 
the approach adopted by the department for each are outlined below.  
Service by service vs provider grant applications—EYQF grants were intended 
to be let on a service by service basis. However, the advisory board viewed this as 
administratively difficult and burdensome for large providers who managed corporate 
functions centrally. To resolve the issue the board recommended applicants apply 
for grants on a provider basis and include details of each service. In briefing the 
Minister the department did not raise any issues with the approach, however did 
advise that individual services within a provider application would be excluded if 
found to be ineligible and, if more than 10 per cent of the services were ineligible, 
the entire application would fail. 
On-costs—EYQF grants were intended to cover flow on costs to employers such as 
workers compensation insurance, and superannuation, which would arise from the 
payment of higher wages to employees. These on-costs were initially set at 
16 per cent. The advisory board considered the percentage allocated was 
inadequate and recommended that on-costs of 25-30 per cent would more 
accurately reflect actual costs associated with the program. The board also noted 
that if on-costs were not increased there was a risk that providers would pass these 
costs on to parents via fee increases. In briefing the Minister the department advised 
that over the sector, on-costs of 20 per cent would reduce the number of 
services/educators assisted by a further 3.5 per cent. Subsequently, the Minister 
sought approval from the Prime Minister to increase the percentage of on-costs 
payable to 20 per cent. This reduced the amount of funding available for wage 
increases by about $10.5 million. 
Competition between small and large providers—EYQF grants were to be made 
available on a first-in basis. The board was concerned that under the first-in 
first-served approach, large providers could quickly deplete the fund at the expense 
of smaller providers. The board determined that splitting the available funding into 
small and large provider pools based on the number of sites per provider could be a 
practical solution to avoid the problem.  
Continued on next page 
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The department provided the board with data on the size distribution of the sector to 
enable the board to determine how the funding for large and small providers might 
be split. The data showed that large providers represented only around 20 per cent 
of child care places and services, however the board determined that the fund 
should be split 50:50 amongst large (defined as providers with more than eleven 
services) and small providers. In briefing the Minister on the recommendation the 
department did not draw adequate attention to the potential impact of the change on 
small providers and the disproportionate distribution that would result, if the 
recommendation was agreed. The department merely reflected the boards advice in 
an attachment to the brief noting that: 
… equitable access to the fund would be promoted by making large 
providers compete against large providers and small providers compete 
against small providers, but noted it would not ensure equal distribution 
and a disproportionate portion of funds was still going to larger providers’. 
The Minister’s Office subsequently made further changes to the definition of a large 
provider59 (with more than 16 services). In correspondence to the Prime Minister 
(drafted by the department) the change was described as ‘promoting equitable access 
to the fund’ and no reference was made to the disproportion which would result. 
3.15 The  advisory board’s  recommendations  (discussed  above)  introduced 
further  risk  that  access  to  grants  by  small  providers,  would  be  further 
diminished.  However,  DEEWR’s  approach  to  briefing  the  Minister  with 
respect to these was not comprehensive. While the department advised on the 











face  barriers  to  putting  one  in  place  (lack  of  expertise,  lack  of  capacity, 
complex workforce with educators working across settings that would not be 
eligible  for  funding  etc).  ECA  [Early  Childhood  Australia]  is  particularly 
concerned that small organisations, both private and not‐for‐profit, will be at a 
                                                     
59  Although the Minister signed a subsequent letter with the changes, there is no contemporaneous 
record of the Minister’s policy decision to change the funding allocation between large and small 
providers from that recommended by the board, nor the increase of on-costs. 
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and  dedicated  HR  personnel  will  potentially  enjoy  a  strong  competitive 
advantage in the application process.60 
3.16 Further, correspondence prepared by the department for the Minister’s 
signature,  to  seek  authority  for  the  change  from  the  Prime  Minister,  was 
ambiguous and described  the  funding  split as promoting equitable access  to 
the fund. The correspondence did not alert  the Minister  to  the  likely effect of 
the change on small providers. 
The wage schedule 
3.17 Applications for EYQF funding were subject to a number of conditions 
including  the  approval  of  an  enterprise  agreement  containing  the  approved 
EYQF  wage  schedule.  The  schedule  set  out  the  hourly  wage  increase 
corresponding  to  each  (employment)  classification  and  was  included  in  the 
EYQF program guidelines, and converted into an Employee Hours and Grants 
Calculator tool used by applicants to determine grant funding.  
3.18 The  wage  schedule  was  not  developed  by  DEEWR  but  was  instead 
provided by United Voice  to  the Prime Minister’s Office  (PMO). On  the day 
the  EYQF  policy  was  announced  (19  March  2013),  an  adviser  in  the  PMO 
forwarded  the wage  schedule  to  the department and  sought  confirmation of 
the estimated number of workers that would be covered (by the $300 million in 
the  fund)  and  advice  as  to  whether  the  United  Voice  calculations  were 
considered correct by  the department. While  the department  raised concerns 
internally about the schedule—including that there was uncertainty about the 
number  of  people  at  different  levels  of  the  award,  and  that  the  schedule 
included  paying  unqualified  staff  and  on‐costs—it  did  not  check  the wages 
schedule for errors and did not provide advice back to the PMO. In the event, 
the  wage  schedule,  issued  with  the  program  guidelines  when  applications 
opened, contained a number of errors including missing classifications.61 These 
errors flowed through to the grants calculator affecting grant funding amounts 
and  were  brought  to  the  department’s  attention  by  United  Voice  on 
19 July 2013,  the day  the guidelines were published. The department  took no 
                                                     
60  Submission from Early Childhood Australia to the Early Years Quality Fund Special Account Bill 2013 
Senate Enquiry, June 2013. 
61  The wage schedule classification scales contained a number of errors. In particular, the grandfathered 
‘A’ classifications in the modern award and a number of the employee classifications were omitted 
from the wage schedule and the Employee Hours and Grants Calculator.  
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action  at  this  time  (the  impact  of  the  error was  not  estimated),  and did  not 
issue  any  amendments  to  the  grant  guidelines.  When  applicants  raised  the 
errors  with  the  department  they  were  advised  to  fit  staff  into  the  existing 
classifications within the wage schedule. Consequently, the department could 
not  confirm  the  accuracy  of  the  requested,  and  subsequently  approved, 
funding amounts.  
3.19 The department subsequently advised the Minister of the errors in late 
July62  and  at  this  time  recommended  that  an  addendum  to  the  program 
guidelines  be  issued.  The  approach  was  agreed  by  the  Minister  and  on 
6 August 2013, after the conditional letters of offer had been finalised, the wage 
schedule  was  modified  to  show  the  additional  classifications.  Although  no 
approach was suggested at the time to verify the accuracy of funding amounts 
requested,  the  department  subsequently  amended  some  amounts  in  the 
funding agreement negotiation process. Overall, the department’s advice to the 
Minister was not  timely  and did not provide  a  clear view  of  the number of 
applicants that were affected. Initial assumptions made by the department that 
the  errors  would  have  minimal  impact  on  the  process  were  not  based  on 
analysis of  the wage  schedule  itself. Earlier  attention  to  the  identified  errors 
would  have  allowed  the  department  to  provide  the  Minister  with  a  more 
accurate assessment, prior to the dispatch of the conditional letters of offer. 
Calculation of Early Years Quality Fund wage increases  
3.20 The  wage  schedule  set  out  wage  increases  of  $3.00  per  hour  for 
Certificate  III qualified educators and a percentage  increase applied over  the 
classification  scale.  The ANAO’s  examination  of  the wage  schedule  showed 
that  the percentages applied  to determine  the hourly wage  increases did not 
align with  the wage  rates  of  the modern  awards  in  force  at  the  time.63  The 
department  advised  that  it  did  not  consider  applying  a  percentage  wage 
increase relative to the award; instead it relied on the wage schedule as it was 
supplied  from  the  PMO. The  funding  increase  available  to  unqualified  staff 
was  less under  the EYQF wage  schedule  than  it would have been using  the 
percentages  applied  to  the  award.  Conversely,  the  increase  available  to 
                                                     
62  The brief itself is undated, but it requests action by the Minister by 31 July 2013 to ensure grant 
approval letters could be sent to successful applicants as soon as possible. 
63  The determination for the Children’s Services Award 2010, available at 
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/awardsandorders/html/PR522982.htm and the determination for 
the Educational Services (Teachers) Award 2010 available at https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/ 
awardsandorders/html/PR522939.htm [accessed on 23 September 2014]. 
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Distribution of the wage schedule 
3.21 As  noted  in  paragraph  3.18,  the  wage  schedule  was  approved  and 
publicly released as part of the program guidelines on 19 July 2013. However, 




on  or  before  the  day  the  program  guidelines  were  released,  using  wage 
schedule  data  that  was  not  officially  available  at  the  time.  Nine  of  these 
included  the employee classifications  that had been omitted  from  the official 
version  of  the wage  schedule. While  the department was  aware64  that  some 
applicants  had  accessed  the  wage  schedule  prior  to  the  release  of  the 
guidelines,  it  did  not  consider  that  these  providers  could  be  advantaged 
through their early access. The department did not put in place any remedy to 




to  the  formal  release  of  the  schedule  as  part  of  the  EYQF  guidelines  on 
19 July 2013.  
Early Years Quality Fund guidelines 
3.22 In  addition  to  working  closely  with  the  board  to  develop  the  grant 
guidelines, the department also needed to work within the broader framework 
provided  by  the  then Commonwealth Grant Guidelines  (CGGs).  The CGGs 
require agency  staff  to ensure  that  the  rules of granting activities are  simply 
expressed,  are  clear  in  their  intent  and  are  effectively  communicated  to 
stakeholders.65 Given  that EYQF  funding was provided on  a demand‐driven 
first‐in first‐served basis,  it was critical  that applicants understood  the details 
of  the program, how  to  apply  and how  their  application would be  assessed 
against  other  applications.  This  would  avoid  potential  costs  to  applicants 
                                                     
64  The department advised it monitored all media streams relevant to the EYQF, including the Big Steps 
Facebook page. 
65  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, Financial Management 
Guidance No. 3, Canberra, June 2013 (2nd Edition) p. 38. 
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issued,  and  later  extended  to  54  pages).67  In  addition,  there were  numerous 
supporting documents  (nine  in  total),  ranging  from  two page Fact  Sheets  to 
18 page  instructions  to  completing  the  EYQF  application.  Much  of  the 
information contained within the documents was repeated. In this respect, the 
department  was  of  the  view  that  repetition  would  address  concerns  that 
providers would  read only parts of  the guidelines. There were  also  areas of 
inconsistency between the guidelines and the supporting documentation. The 
resulting guidelines were complicated and not conducive  to a  first‐in process 
where applicants would need  to be poised  to  take action and made decisions 




3.24 The  initial  recommendation  of  the  advisory  board  was  to  make  the 
guidelines  available  to  applicants  two  weeks  prior  to  applications  opening. 
However,  a  decision  by  the  Minister’s  Office  to  expedite  the  application 
process  resulted  in  applicants  only  having  two working  days  (four  days  in 
total) to read and understand the guidelines and supporting documents before 
applications opened on 23 July 2013. Given the tight timeframe, the volume of 




66  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, June 2013, 
paragraph 8.7. 
67  An Addendum to the guidelines was published on 8 August 2013 bringing the total to 54 pages. 
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Successful  implementation  requires  early,  informed  and  systemic 
consideration of  issues as  they arise and mitigation of  risks. Equitable access 
was a significant risk  that needed  to be managed as EYQF was  implemented 
but  in  practice,  accessibility  to  EYQF  grants  was  reduced  by  limited 
consultation  and  public  information  about  the  EYQF  grant  process. 
Communication with the child care sector was intended to be managed by the 
EYQF advisory board.68 However, the board’s ability to inform the sector was 
constrained  by  delays  in  its  establishment.  Although  the  department  had 
developed  a  communication  plan,  in  practice  few  communication  activities 
occurred. The advice provided to the sector by the department was limited and 
where inconsistent information was provided to the sector by third parties, the 
department’s  response was  low  key  and did  not  extend  to  the  provision  of 
more comprehensive information for the sector. The communication approach 
combined with the short timeframe set by the then government—two working 
days  between  the  guidelines  being  released  and  the  program  applications 
opening—was  not  conducive  to  a  first‐in  first‐served  environment,  where 
applicants  needed  to  be  poised  to  make  business  decisions  and  act  quickly 
when applications opened. 
3.26 Some  of  the  recommendations  from  the  advisory  board  and  the 
complexity of  the program guidelines also posed significant risks  to program 
accessibility.  The  department  did  not  consider  the  impact  that  these  risks 
would have on the successful implementation of the EYQF and did not put in 
place  adequate  mitigations  to  avoid  the  adverse  outcomes  which  arose.  In 
addition, DEEWR was aware of stakeholder concerns with respect to program 
access for smaller providers reported during the Parliamentary  inquiries, and 
should  have  drawn  more  attention  to  the  disparity  created  by  the  board’s 
recommendation  (concerning  the  50:50  split  of  funding)  in  the  advice  and 
correspondence provided  to  its Minister. With  respect  to  the wage  schedule, 
the department  could have  taken more  care  to ensure  that  the  schedule was 
correct  from  the outset.  In addition,  the department  should have  considered 
the risk presented by some providers having early access to the schedule. 
                                                     
68  The EYQF advisory board comprised sector representatives and was established as part of the EYQF 
policy parameters and aimed to provide advice to the Minister during the implementation and design 
stages of the fund. 
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4. Access to the Program and 
Assessment of Applications 
This  chapter  examines  the  department’s  processes  for  submitting  and  assessing 
applications, the recommendation to the delegate and the final funding decision. 
Introduction 
4.1 The main objective  in  implementing a granting activity  is to maximise 
the  cost‐effective achievement of  the outcomes  sought by government, while 
providing transparent and equitable access to grants.69 This includes ensuring 
that  the  assessment  process  accords  with  the  established  grant  program 
requirements.  Several  aspects  of  the  design  of  the  EYQF  contained  risks 
relevant  to  the successful receipt and assessment of grant applications. These 
included  the allocation of grants on a  first‐in  first‐served basis, and  the short 
timeframe  available  for  applicants  to  download  and  complete  application 







 assessment  outcomes  against  the  criteria  in  the  guidelines  and  the 
revisions adopted by the department; and 
 record‐keeping practices. 
Overview of EYQF application process 
4.3 In keeping with the then government’s expectations, the entire process 
from  application  to  approval  was  short,  spanning  just  two  weeks.  Sample 
application  forms  were  available  for  potential  applicants  to  download  and 
view  from  11:00am  AEST  Friday 19 July 2013,  two  business  days  prior  to 
                                                     
69  ANAO Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration – Better Practice Guide December 2013, 
Section 4.2.1 p 30. 
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applications  opening.  Applications  opened  at  11:00  a.m.  AEST  on 
Tuesday 23 July 2013 at which  time,  the final version of  the application forms 
could be downloaded and completed. The timeline and key milestones for the 
grant assessment and selection process is outlined at Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Early Years Quality Fund grant process timeframe  
Event Date 
Program documents available on EYQF website 19 July 2013 
Application process opened 23 July 2013 
Assessment process  23 July – 2 August 201370 
Approval process 26 July – 2 August 2013 
Letters sent to applicants 27 July – 2 August 2013 
Funding agreements executed 6 September 2013 
Source: ANAO analysis of department documents. 
4.4 Applicants were divided into small and large provider pools and could 
only  apply  for  grant  funding  appropriate  to  their  size.  The  $300m  funding 
available was split equally between the two pools. Applicants were required to 




4.5 Aside  from  the  classifications of  large or  small providers,  there were 
separate forms for:  
 Single service providers; and 
 Multi‐service  providers  (submitting  on  behalf  of  more  than  one 
service).71 
4.6 The  department  registered  1173  submissions72  between  11.00am  on 
23 July, when the EYQF application process commenced, and 25 September 2013, 
when  the  last  recorded email was  received. The $300 million  funding  cap was 
                                                     
70  Assessments for five applications were dated after 2 August, however, these appear to be anomalies 
in the process, for example, relating to the reconciliation process. The reconciliation process is 
discussed in more detail at paragraph 4.49. 
71  A provider with more than one service could also choose to submit individual applications on a per 
service basis using the single service provider form.  
72  Applications could be received in multiple email submissions. 
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the  order  they  were  received  and  assessment  was  to  continue  until  the 
$300 million  funding  cap  was  reached.  To  support  equitable  access  to  the 
program,  DEEWR  needed  to  adopt  an  approach  for  managing  EYQF 
applications which both accurately captured the receipt time of each application 
and  allowed  for  the  efficient  processing  of  applications.  The  approach  also 
needed  to be able  to manage a  large number of applications—more  than 6000 
providers  of  long  day  care  services  could  have  potentially  applied  for  EYQF 
grants—and meet the government’s expectations in relation to timing.  
4.8 The  guidelines  acknowledged  that  the  EYQF  was  capped  and  not  all 
eligible applicants  that applied would be approved  for  funding. As a result of 
these policy settings, management of the applications process using the first‐in 
first‐served  rule  depended  upon  an  accurate  applications  receipt  process, 
supported  by  well‐maintained  records  to  demonstrate  an  accountable, 
transparent and equitable process.  
The grant application system  
4.9 To  manage  the  grant  application  process,  DEEWR  considered  its 
options including developing a new system, or modifying existing procedures 
based  on  the  Child  Care  Management  System  (CCMS).73  In  the  end  the 
department decided  to use  the  existing  email  system as  it was working  to a 
compressed timeframe for implementation, which at that time, required grants 
to be paid  from 1  July 2013. The requirements of  the email based application 
process were discussed with departmental IT staff, and a number of risks were 




73  The Child Care Management System is a national online computer system. All approved child care 
services are required by law to operate under the system. Child care services use the Child Care 
Management System to record child enrolment and attendance information. This data is used by the 
department to calculate fee reductions and pay services on behalf of eligible families.  
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Time differences in the receipt of emails 
4.10 Very small  time differences had  implications for  the first‐in first‐served 
order of applications. The department did not anticipate that EYQF applications 
could be delayed as  they passed  through  the department’s email gateway and 
that this delay would affect the time that applications were received in the EYQF 
email  inbox. The ANAO’s examination of  the  time of receipt of applications at 
the  department’s  gateway  and  in  the  EYQF  inbox  found  that  64 applications 
were  delayed  at  the  gateway.  Overall,  while  none  of  the  applications  were 
subsequently  released  after  the  funding  cap  had  been  reached,  54  of  the  64 
applications were ranked lower on the list of applications than they would have 




Mailbox size limits and the requirement for a complete application 
4.11 There  was  a  range  of  details  about  how  the  grant  program  would 
operate  that  were  not  resolved  in  the  guidelines  when  they  were  released, 
including  some processing  rules  that were not clearly  stated. Section 3.3.3 of 
the guidelines stated that only fully completed applications would be assessed. 
A  later  section  of  the  guidelines  notes  that  when  attaching  supporting 






first‐served  queue,  or  the  final  email  that  was  received,  signifying  that  the 
application was complete. The department decided that the first email received 
was to be used to identify where an application was placed on the receipt list. 
While  this  information  was  provided  in  the  guide  to  completing  the  EYQF 
Application  Form,  it  was  not  detailed  in  the  guidelines.  There  were 
11 instances74  where  this  rule  was  not  applied.  This  resulted  in  these  11 
                                                     
74  Recognising that four of these first submission emails were delayed at the gateway. 
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EYQF  guidelines,  of  listing  applicants  based upon  the  receipt  of  a  complete 
application  (which  might  be  considered  to  be  when  the  last  email  was 
received), including where an applicant sent more than one email,75 this would 
have  resulted  in  13 applications  that  were  processed,  falling  below  other 
applications  that had been  excluded. The  last of  these part  applications was 
received after 102 applications were excluded as a consequence of the funding 
cap being reached.  
4.14 The  identification of  completed  applications was  also  complicated by 
some  applicants making  amendments  to  their  applications  and  resubmitting 
them in part or full. The guidelines stated that a service that sought to alter or 









75  Whether as part of one submission, or to correct or amend an application. 
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Figure 4.1: Email receipt and the subsequent processing of 
applications 
 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
Other problems with the registration of applications 
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 the  first  submission  email  of  an  application  was  assessed  as 





an extent  that one application was approved  twice and  the other was 
not approved  (with  the related emails all being assessed as duplicates 
of the approved application); and 
 one  application  was  incorrectly  connected  to  another  application, 
resulting in the original application not being assessed at all. 
Assessment of applications  
4.17 Demand‐driven  granting  activities  can  be  an  effective  means  of 
providing  intended  recipients  with  efficient  access  to  funding  in  order  to 
facilitate the achievement of the intended objective. The approach may also be 
effective  in minimising  administrative  costs. However,  the  role  of  eligibility 
criteria  applied  in  relevant  granting  activities  is  of particular  importance.  In 
order to be effective, criteria must both reflect the core objective of the granting 
activity and be capable of appropriate scrutiny and objective validation.76  
4.18 The EYQF  criteria as  set out  in  the program guidelines were divided 
into  three  categories:  eligibility  of  the  applicant;  compliance  with 
documentation  requirements;  and assessment of  the applicant’s  commitment 
to  the  National  Quality  Framework  (NQF).  These  criteria  were  in  effect 
threshold  criteria  and  where  an  applicant  could  demonstrate  they  met  the 
requirement  they would receive  funding,  if  the organisation was placed high 
enough in the order of receipt. 
4.19 As  noted  at  paragraph  4.6,  the  department’s  main  record  of  the 
application process  shows  that a  total of 1173  submissions were  received  for 
funding under EYQF. A breakdown of  the main  record detailing  the  type of 
applications received and how they were assessed is provided in Figure 4.2: 
                                                     
76  ANAO Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration – Better Practice Guide December 2013, 
p 49. 
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Figure 4.2: Department’s main record of applications received77 
 
Source: ANAO analysis from the department’s main record of the EYQF grants process and outcome. 
Notes: 1. Seven applications were re-classified as ‘assessed as compliant’ after the reconciliation process 
(the reconciliation process is discussed in more detail at paragraph 4.49). 
 2. Advice from the department is that all of these applications, including those marked not 
assessed, did subsequently undergo assessment. 
3. Re-applications are discussed in more detail at paragraph 5.9. 
4. 49 multi-service provider applications (869 individual services) were actually assessed by the 
department (discussed in more detail at paragraph 4.32). 
5. 444 single service applications were assessed (discussed in more detail at paragraph 4.32). 
6. Due to a number of errors in the main record, a total of 1309 individual services were assessed 
by the department prior to the funding cap being reached (discussed in more detail at 
paragraph 4.32). 
                                                     
77  Figure 4.2 is a point in time representation of the outcome of the reconciliation process completed 
after the funding decision was made and letters of offer sent to successful applicants. Consequently, 
the record does not accurately record the outcome of the original assessment process which was used 
to support the funding recommendation made to the EYQF delegate. 
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4.20 To be eligible, an applicant had  to be approved under  the Child Care 
Benefit Scheme (CCB) as a provider of Long Day Care (LDC) services and not 
have an overall  rating of  ‘significant  improvement  required’ under  the NQF. 
Applicants also needed to be compliant under the Education and Care Services 
National Regulations,78 and the Fair Work Act 2009. 
CCB approved provider status 
4.21 Applicants were required to supply their CCB approval number so that 
the  department  could  verify  their  approval  status.  Early  assessment  of 
applications  identified  that a  large number of applicants had misunderstood 
the requirement and provided a number other than the CCB approval number. 
Consequently, the department revised its approach to cross match applications 
to  those  that  could  be  identified  on  the  department’s  list  of CCB  approved 
LDC providers. Overall, one application was assessed as ineligible because the 




applications  identified a  further nine  services  connected  to  five multi‐service 
providers and one single service provider  that were not on  the department’s 
CCB approved  list. While  the department advised  that  further  investigations 
were conducted when an applicant could not be located on the CCB approved 
list, there was limited evidence of this in records from the assessment process. 
Compliance with the national laws and regulations 
4.22 The department did not deem any services or providers ineligible due 
to  compliance  issues  with  the  National  Laws  and  Regulations80,  although 
compliance  issues  arose  with  some  applications  during  the  course  of  the 
assessment  process.  The  department managed  these  compliance  issues  on  a 
                                                     
78  Available at <http://www.acecqa.gov.au/national-regulations> [accessed 2 July 2014]. 
79  The program guidelines indicate that with respect to multi-service provider applications, an entire 
application would be ineligible if 10 per cent of the services in an application were not CCB approved 
LDC services. 
80  To assess these criteria the department reviewed information provided by relevant internal data 
management and compliance areas, and the Fair Work Ombudsman, seeking further information from 
these areas as required. The substantive assessment of eligibility occurred outside of the documented 
assessment process and no systematic process or comprehensive record of the eligibility assessment 
was retained with other assessment records, this was particularly with respect to compliance with the 
National Laws and Regulations. 
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case  by  case  basis  and  concluded  that  none  of  the  issues  identified  were 
significant  and  all  could  be  monitored  through  funding  agreements.  In 
reviewing  the  department’s  records,  the  ANAO  identified  14  services  with 
possible  compliance  issues.  However  in  approving  the  applications,  the 
delegate was only advised of issues with eight services. There was no evidence 





4.23 The  compliance  criteria  established  in  the  guidelines  included  a 
requirement to provide a complete and accurate application form and provide all 
mandatory attachments, with only  fully completed applications being assessed. 
The  guidelines  stated  that  a  service  which  sought  to  alter  or  change  its 




information  repeated multiple  times. For example, applicants were  required  to 
provide details of current staff in the application form, the grants calculator, the 
Workforce Development  Plan  (WDP)  and  the  applicant’s most  recent  payroll. 
Overall,  the  arrangement  was  not  conducive  to  a  first‐in  first‐served  process 
where applicants were required to submit their applications quickly.  
Revision of compliance criteria 
4.24 The department  formally revised and relaxed some of  the compliance 
requirements.  These  revisions  extended  to  the  department  accepting 
applications that had incomplete application forms or which used the incorrect 
form  and  applications  where  the  attachments  did  not  meet  the  stated 
requirements.81 The department decided  to adopt what  it  called a  ‘substance 
over form’ approach, on the basis that some applications may be substantially 




81  Applications that were submitted using sample forms provided to applicants prior to the application 
form being released on 23 July. 
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and  notwithstanding  probity  advice  that  highlighted  a  number  of  risks,  for 
example,  around using  sample  forms  or waiving  the  requirement  to  have  a 
complete application. With respect to this last change, the advice provided was 
that  such  an  approach  would  put  applicants  that  took  additional  time  to 
complete their applications correctly at a disadvantage compared to applicants 
that submitted earlier, incomplete applications.  
4.25 The department’s  approach  effectively  varied  the  application process 
and  the  mandatory  requirements.  The  assessment  teams  were  required  to 
make judgements about what was required for a complete application. ANAO 
analysis  identified  a  number  of  other  informal82  revisions  adopted  by  the 
department  throughout  the compliance checking process  including accepting 
incomplete grant calculators and evidence of a serviceʹs employeesʹ support for 
the NQF which did not  include  the  required  statement or did not otherwise 
meet the documentation requirements. Two further applications were assessed 
as  non‐compliant;  one  for  not  signing  the  declaration  at  the  end  of  the 
application form and the other for failing to complete the application form. The 
missing  information  was  in  fact  provided  in  both  forms,  although  it  was 
hidden  from  view;  an  assessor  would  have  been  required  to  click  on  the 
relevant information box of the form to display the information.83  
4.26 Due to the degree of revisions, inconsistencies in the application of the 
requirements  in  the guidelines and missing documentation,  the department’s 
approach  to  assessing  compliance was  not  uniform. Accordingly,  there was 
only  limited assurance that the process applied by the department to  identify 





 a  statement  (at  the  service  level)  regarding  the  collaborative  approach 




82  These revisions were not agreed by the delegate. 
83  This issue was most likely caused by a software compatibility problem. 
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 a  Workforce  Development  Plan  (WDP),84  containing  specific 
information about staff and  training. The EYQF guidelines also stated 
that  the  strategies  in  the  WDP  were  to  inform  the  reporting  and 
acquittal processes in the funding agreement.85  
4.28 The department advised  the ANAO  that  the assessment  criteria were 
ultimately not used86 to inform decisions on eligibility of applications and there 
was no  consideration of whether  the  required  content had been provided  in 
line  with  the  guidelines.  Rather,  only  a  general  consideration  was  given  to 
whether information had been provided. In instances where it was considered 
necessary, the department advised that it would make a note to follow‐up with 
a  particular  applicant  in  the  development  of  a  funding  agreement;  there  is 
limited  evidence  indicating  that  follow up occurred. The  funding  agreement 
process is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.  
Assessment guidance and revisions to the criteria 
4.29 The grants administration framework requires decision makers to make 
grant  decisions  in  a  manner  that  is  consistent  with  the  relevant  guidelines. 
There may  be  instances where  in  light  of  changed  circumstances,  it may  be 
necessary  to waive  or  amend  criteria  for  a  grant  activity.87 However,  in  the 
interests  of  transparency  it  is  important  that  stakeholders  are  informed  of 
amendments  in  a  timely  manner  through  publication  of  revised  guidelines, 
and  that  consideration  is  given  to  the  impact  changes  may  have  on 
applications already submitted.88  
                                                     
84  The Workforce Development Plan needed to include information about whether a service met the 
requirements of the NQF and include details of current staff numbers and their qualifications as well as 
the number of additional staff required to meet the requirements. In addition the WDP needed to show 
any qualifications those staff may have acquired at the service over the previous 12 months relevant to 
the NQF strategies such as upskilling, staff recruitment, professional development relevant to the 
NQF, and other details of how the service intended to meet and maintain the qualification 
requirements commencing on 1 January 2014. 
85  Other requirements under the two assessment criteria included the provision of information in the 
application form and attaching specific documents. These requirements were already assessed as 
part of the application compliance check. 
86  The department selected a random sample of applicants to provide a copy the QIP for review as per 
section 4.3.1 of the guidelines, which were to support the statement about how the QIP was 
developed. It is unclear how the QIPs provided were used to support the statement about the QIPs 
development, noting also that no application was excluded after the sample of QIPs were considered. 
87  CGGs, op.cit., p. 62. 
88  ANAO Better Practice Guide, Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration, Canberra, 
December 2013, p. 52. 
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4.30 The EYQF guidelines noted  that amendments  to  the guidelines  could 
be made where it was considered necessary.89 As noted at paragraph 4.26, after 
identifying  a  number  of  problems  with  the  assessment  documentation,  the 
department issued assessors with a series of revisions to the selection process. 
The  department  did  not  issue  updated  assessment  guidance  to  reflect  the 
revisions, but rather relied on notes and verbal advice to assessors to advise of 




4.31 The  effect of  the  revisions was  that many of  the  criteria  in  the EYQF 
guidelines were nullified. The changes did not exclude applications, but rather, 
had  the  effect  of making  applications  that did  not meet  the  original  criteria 
eligible  for  funding.  The  assessment  teams  also  made  a  number  of  other 
changes during  the  course  of  the grants  assessments  that were not  formally 
documented or universally applied. These  changes  included accepting  forms 
that did not  tick boxes or  indicate yes or no  (where  the  information was not 
otherwise available), and forms that were not signed by the service’s contact. 
Assessment and reassessment of applications 
4.32 The department registered 1173 submissions between 11:00am on 23 July, 
when  the EYQF application process commenced, and 25 September 2013, when 
the  last  recorded  email was  received  (refer  Figure  4.2). ANAO  analysis  of  the 
submissions  indicates  that  the  total number of  applications  assessed up  to  the 
point that the EYQF funding cap was reached included: 






main  record  as  compared  to  the  actual  assessment  approach  for  each 
                                                     
89  EYQF guidelines p. 8. 
90  Probity advice around the proposed revisions detailing the impacts on applicants was received by the 
department, see paragraph 4.24 for further discussion. 
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identified  as  a  duplicate  (including  in  error)  and  includes  where  the 
department has approved the same application more than once.  
4.34 The  number  of  revisions  in  the  assessment  process  (discussed  at 
paragraph 4.30) and difficulties experienced in identifying multiple submission 
emails  (paragraph  4.16)  resulted  in  assessors  assessing  and  reassessing 
applications multiple  times. However,  the approach  to  reassessment was not 
clearly documented or uniform.  Individual  assessment  sheets were  found  to 
contain  multiple  assessments;  of  the  single  service  providers,  more  than 
32 per cent were assessed three or more times regardless of whether they had 
been found to be eligible and compliant in a previous assessment. In addition, 
there  were  232 assessments  that  did  not  state  what  type  of  assessment  had 
been conducted, 50 assessments that did not identify the name of the assessor, 
and  79 assessments  that  did  not  identify  the  date  of  the  assessment.  While 
provision was also made to undertake quality assurance processes by checking 






for  all  49 assessed  multi‐service  providers.  However,  documentation 
supporting the individual service level assessments could not be identified for 
all  of  these  applications.  The  data  in  Table  4.2  illustrates  the  number  of 
assessments  identified  at  the  service  level  for  assessed  applications;  these 
applications  represented  1309  individual  services.91  There  was  no  recorded 
assessment  for  710  services  submitted  through  multi‐service  provider 
applications  (nearly  82 per cent).  These  services  were  part  of  nine 
applications.92 
                                                     
91  The total of 1309 services excludes services where the ANAO could not make a determination; 
namely, the assessments of four single service applications (relating to five separate services). 
Additionally, the analysis of assessments includes those for applications registered and later 
connected to another application and for quality assurance processes; it excludes one submission 
connected to another application where the ANAO could not determine how the department undertook 
the assessment; and 34 assessments for 20 multi-service provider applications where the assessor 
did not identify the service the assessment related to are also excluded. 
92  The department advised that individual service assessments were not completed for three applications 
because they were found non-compliant during the multi-service provider assessment stage. 
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Table 4.2: Number of assessments per service application 
 Number of assessments per service 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 15 
Number of multi-service 
provider services 710 133 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of single service 
provider services 0 134 162 88 31 17 6 1 1 
Source: ANAO analysis of EYQF assessment records. 
4.36 For the six largest multi‐service applications, there was no record kept 
on the assessment of their services connected to their grant applications.93 This 
included  the  two  largest providers;  the applications  for which were made up 
of  642 and  42  services,  with  a  total  funding  commitment  of  $144.2 million. 
Identifying  the  risks  associated  with  these  two  providers  which  both  had 
representatives on the EYQF advisory board, the applications were assessed by 
senior assessors. In approving this first batch of applications (on 26 July 2013), 
the delegate was advised  that  the application with  the highest  funding value 
had been assessed electronically due to its size (totalling over 5000 pages). The 
department confirmed that the assessment included a review of all 642 services 
on a computer screen. However, other  than a minute  to  the delegate,  there  is 
no record of a comprehensive service level assessment for this application. The 
department  advised  the  ANAO  that  service  level  assessment  sheets  were 
completed  for  the  other  five  large  multi‐service  provider  applications,  but 
copies of  these have not been  retained  in  the department’s  records. Creating 
and maintaining appropriate records of assessments is important for reasons of 
accountability and transparency. 
4.37 As  noted  above,  the  department  maintained  a  central  record  of  the 
number of applications  received  (the main  record), which  included all of  the 
department’s  completed  funding  assessment  records  and  was  intended  to 
provide  a  comprehensive  record  of  the  assessment  process  and  the  final 
assessment  outcome  (discussed  in more detail  at paragraph  4.44). However, 
there  were  inconsistencies  between  the  information  recorded  in  the  main 
record,  the  individual  assessments,  and  the  information  provided  to  the 
delegate  as part  of  the  recommendation  for  funding.94  In  some  instances  no 
                                                     
93  For one of these five multi-service providers a service level assessment sheet was not completed for 
one of its services only. A small number of generic service level assessment sheets that were not 
specific to any of the identified services were completed across these providers. 
94  A comparison of the various records of assessment outcomes is included at Appendix 3. 
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4.38 Information contained  in  the EYQF wage schedule (discussed  in more 
detail  in  chapter  3)  was  converted  into  an  Employee  Hours  and  Grants 
Calculator  (grants  calculator)  and  issued  as  part  of  the  program  guidelines. 
The assessment process used by  the department omitted any  reference  to an 
assessment  of  the  funding  requested  or  the  information  in  the  grants 
calculator, with  the department advising  that  limited analysis  in  this  respect 
was  undertaken.  ANAO  analysis  indicates  that  eight per cent  of  approved 
applications  contained discrepancies  between  the  amount  requested  and  the 
actual amounts calculated. 




managing  grant  rounds  and  was  provided  with  significant  additional 
resources96  to manage  the  implementation of  the EYQF  in  recognition of  the 
volume  of  assessments  and  the  rapid  roll  out  of  the  program.  While  the 
department  promptly  put  in  place  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the 
assessments  to be  conducted,  the approach  taken was not underpinned by a 
probity  plan  and  the  assessment  documentation  could  have  been  more 
consistent with the EYQF guidelines. 
Probity considerations 
4.40 The  CGGs  require  that  when  conducting  granting  processes  entities 
establish  transparent  processes  which  help  manage  misconceptions  and  the 
                                                     
95  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, Financial Management 
Guidance No. 3, Canberra, June 2013 (2nd Edition) p 53. 
96  The department received a total of $8.2 million over three years from 2012-13 to manage the EYQF. 
The allocation for 2013-14 was $3.4 million comprising 28 full time non-executive level staff. 
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various  stages  during  the  course  of  implementing  the  EYQF  and  it  was 
emphasised  in  the management of  the advisory board. Probity arrangements 
were  put  in  place  for  DEEWR  staff  involved  in  the  assessment  process, 
including conflict of interest declarations. Conflict of interest declarations were 
also required from providers applying for EYQF grants.  
4.41 The  probity  arrangements  for  individuals  included  existing 
departmental  procedures  and  specific  procedures  in  relation  to  EYQF. 
However,  the processes  and procedures were not  fully  consistent with  each 
other  which  increased  the  risk  of  inconsistent  decision  making.  The  EYQF 
guidelines  indicate  in  one  place  that  individuals  with  a  potential  conflict 
cannot access information and assess applications where the conflict of interest 
exists. In one case, a conflict of interest did arise and conflicts of interest were 
declared  by  the  provider  and  the  staff  member  concerned.  The  department 
advised  the  ANAO  that  having  considered  the  declarations  and  the  first‐in 
first‐served  nature  of  the  program,  it  was  sufficient  to  exclude  the  staff 
member  from  involvement  with  the  specific  application.  However,  the 
guidelines  also  included  stronger  conflict  of  interest  management  processes 
which  indicated  that  whether  the  conflict  can  be  avoided  or  not,  the  staff 
member would be excluded from any duty that could be seen to give rise to a 
conflict of  interest. While  the guidelines provided  two possible management 






task. The  assessors  (including  three  senior  assessors)98  received  training  and 
were  provided  with  assessment  documentation  (instructions  and  templates 
assessment sheets)  in order  to conduct assessments. Although  the assessment 
                                                     
97  The CGG’s require that entities put in place appropriate mechanisms for identifying and managing 
potential conflicts of interest for granting activities, and that any conflicts arising be managed in all 
phases of the grant administration. Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant 
Guidelines, Second Edition, June 2013, p. 58. 
98  The department’s processes made provision for the quality assurance of a proportion of applications 
by a senior assessor. However, in practice there was no clear delineation of roles between assessors 
and senior-assessors. 
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an  accurate  assessment  against  each  of  the EYQF  criteria,  resulting  in  some 
confusion  in  the  assessment  process.  For  example,  one  criterion—the 
substantive  assessment  of  compliance  with  the  National  Laws  and 
Regulations—was not included in the assessment sheet. Also, two questions on 
the  sheet  were  poorly  phrased  resulting  in  neither  a  positive  or  negative 
response  accurately  reflecting whether  the  applicant  had met  the  respective 
requirements.  
4.43 On  commencement  of  the  assessment  process,  after  identifying  a 
number of problems with  the assessment and application documentation,  the 
department  issued  assessors  with  a  series  of  revisions  to  the  assessment 
process. The department did not, however, update the assessment instructions 
or templates to reflect the revisions, relying instead on notes and verbal advice.  
Assessment outcomes and funding decisions 
4.44 A transparent and accountable decision‐making process for the award 
of  grant  funding  includes  the  obligation  on  an  agency  to  provide  a  clear 
funding  recommendation  to an approver, and provide sufficient advice as  to 
the basis for a recommendation. 
Advice to the delegate 
4.45 The Minister agreed  to  the delegation of  the authority  to approve  the 
grants under  the EYQF  to  the program manager within  the department. On 
23 July 2013  the  delegate  gave  FMA  Regulation  9  approval  to  expend 
$300 million  under  the  EYQF,  with  separate  approval  subsequently  being 
sought  for  each  successful  service before  entering  into a  funding agreement. 
The approval minute set out the basis of the approval including who would be 
eligible to receive funding and how the funding amount would be allocated in 
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submitted  for  approval  in  batch  four,  before  365  other  small  provider 
applications  which  were  submitted  for  approval  in  batches  five  to  23.  The 




4.47 The  approval  batches  advised  the  delegate  of  the  outcome  of  the 
assessment process,  but  not  the  assessment process undertaken. That  is,  the 
briefs did not refer to the revisions made to the criteria and incorrectly stated 
that  compliant  applications  were  assessed  against  the  assessment  criteria 
(discussed  in  paragraph  4.28  and  4.31  respectively).  As  well,  there  were  a 
number  of  errors  in  the  approval  briefs  covering  the  23 batches  described 
above, which affected the financial allocations. The delegate, who was also the 
program  manager,  was  aware  of  the  revisions  in  the  process  and  of  the 
department’s  intentions generally. However,  in  the  interests  of  transparency 
and  accountability,  the  advice  in  the  briefs  should  have  been  an  accurate 
reflection of  the application and selection process undertaken.99  It would also 
have  been  of  benefit  for  the  department  to  have  made  a  clearer  funding 
recommendation to the delegate. Such a funding recommendation would have 
included  identifying  the  applications  recommended  for  funding  and  the 
applications  that were being approved subject  to  funding becoming available 
within the appropriation.100 
Advice to applicants 
4.48 The department sent conditional letters of offer to applicants after they 
were  approved  under  a  given  batch,  but  before  all  batches were  approved. 
That  is,  conditional  letters  of  offer  for  applicants  approved  in  batches 
1 to 16 were dated  the day before  the delegate  approved  batches  17 to 23  on 
2 August 2013.  In  this respect,  the overall  funding approved was not verified 
before  advice  (including  the  conditional  funding  amount)  was  sent  to 
applicants.  
                                                     
99  ANAO Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration – Better Practice Guide December 2013, 
p 72. 
100  Ibid. p. 71. 
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The reconciliation process 
4.49 After the initial funding decision was made, the department undertook 
a  reconciliation  of  the  assessment  outcomes.  This  was  an  important 
undertaking given the number of applications received and assessed within a 
limited  timeframe  during  the  initial  assessment  process.  Records  show  the 
reconciliation  started  shortly  after  the delegate  signed  the  final  approval  on 
2 August,  with  an  initial  focus  on  reconciling  funding  amounts,  and  was 
finalised on 27 August 2013.  
4.50 The minute  states  that  a  number  of  errors were  identified;  however, 
that the overall number was very low compared to the number of applications 
received. Errors included: 










mixed  applications,  incorrect  funding  amounts,  and  inaccurately  recorded 
information. These errors also had an impact on the overall outcome, and in at 
least one instance, compounded an error in the initial process. Specifically one 
application, which was approved  twice due  to an assessment  error, was not 
identified  in  the  reconciliation.  Rather,  the  reconciliation  identified  this 
application as  receiving a conditional  letter of offer with a  funding offer  less 
than  the  amount  requested.  The  funding  amount  for  the  application  was 
increased  as  a  result,  despite  the  additional  amount  not  relating  to  this 
application.  
Basis for approval 
4.53 Under the Commonwealth’s financial framework, promoting the proper 
use and management of public resources is a fundamental duty of accountable 
authorities.  Both  the  FMA  Act  and  the  PGPA  Act  operate  to  place  a 
responsibility  on  the  accountable  authority  to  promote  the  proper  use  and 
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management  of  public  resources  in  a  way  that  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
policies of the Australian Government. In a demand‐driven, first‐in first‐served 
process, the test of whether a spending proposal is consistent with the policies of 
the Commonwealth  is  satisfied where  eligible  and  compliant  applications  (in 
accordance with criteria documented  in  the program guidelines) are approved 
in order of receipt, up to the point that the appropriation is expended. 
4.54 The  department’s  financial  controls  were  not  sufficient  to  support 
accurate  financial approvals and grant offers. The original FMA Regulation 9 
approval minute  signed  by  the delegate  approved  the  expenditure  of  up  to 
$300 million  over  two  financial  years. Analysis  of  the  total  funding  amount 
committed  by  the  Commonwealth  varies  across  different  records,  including 
the  original  approval  briefs,  the  attachments  to  those  briefs  and  the  total 
funding amounts  in  the  letters of offer. An analysis of  the various records of 
total committed  funding  is provided at Table 4.3 below, which also  indicates 
that  the conditional funding offers made  to applicants exceeded  the available 
appropriation.  As  the  program  was  subsequently  terminated,  only 
$62.5 million was paid to applicants as discussed in paragraph 1.14. 
Table 4.3: Total funding committed 
Source Total committed amount 
Approval briefs to the delegate $302,761,881 
Total funding amounts identified in the attachments to the 
approval briefs $302,510,881 
ANAO calculation of total funding amounts in the attachments 
to the approval briefs $303,174,899 
Conditional letters of offer $300,219,619 
Reconciliation advice on the total funding amount committed 
(based on the conditional letters of offer) $300,221,469 
Source: ANAO analysis of departmental records.  
Conclusion 
4.55 DEEWR’s approach to accepting and assessing applications for the EYQF 
was  inadequate  and  did  not  ensure  fair  treatment  of  applications  during  the 
application  process.  There  are  inherent  risks  associated  with  submission 
processes  under  any  granting  activity,  including  those  that  rely  on  electronic 
systems. While there are many benefits to adopting an electronic system, there is 
also a requirement to adequately manage that system ensuring that it is reliable 
and  provides  a  robust,  accountable  and  auditable  trail  of  decisions  and 
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transactions.  In  this  context,  while  the  department  identified  some  risks 
associated  with  the  electronic  submission  process  the  department  did  not 
adequately  address  subsequent  issues  that  emerged.  As  a  consequence,  this 
affected  the delivery of EYQF  in accordance with  the guidelines  to  the  extent 
that a number of applications were not processed on a first‐in, first‐served basis. 
4.56 The  department  was  required  to  identify  and  assess  nearly  620 
submissions (within the funding cap) in a compressed timeframe shorter than 
that originally  envisaged, however  the  resulting assessment process was not 
consistent  with  the  program  guidelines  and  the  CGGs.  Furthermore  an 
analysis  of  the departmentʹs  assessment  of more  than half  of  the  services  in 
these submissions was not possible because a record of the specific assessment 
has  not  been  retained.  The  initial  assessment  criteria  were  included  in  the 
guidelines to fulfil the requirement to meet eligibility criteria set out within the 
approved  EYQF  policy.  However,  these  criteria  were  not  relevant  or 






criteria  should  be  fully  documented,  potential  applicants  advised,  and 
processes updated  to  reflect  the changes. The department may have decided 
that, given the quality of the applications received, the revisions it made were 
necessary in order to meet the contracted assessment timeframe. However, by 
choosing  to  accept  applications  it  considered  substantially  complete  rather 
than  completed  according  to  the  guidelines,  the  selection  process  was  no 
longer  equitable,  favouring  applicants  that  submitted  incomplete  and 
inaccurate applications ahead of applicants that submitted applications which 
fulfilled all the original criteria.  
4.58 The  degree  to  which  the  department  altered  the  original  assessment 
process set out the EYQF guidelines had an overall impact on the ability of the 
delegate  to  demonstrate  that  the  approvals  made  in  the  batched  briefs 
accorded with the guidelines. The advice to the delegate in the batched briefs 
was also insufficient, resulting in the delegate approving funding in excess of 
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of offer; measures  to  address  the over‐approval of  funding  and  the possible 
ramifications were never fully considered; and, an accurate reconciliation was 
not undertaken. The  early  termination of  the program and  the  revocation of 
remaining funds offers meant that only $62.5 million was spent. However, had 
all  the  offers  for EYQF  funding been  taken up  at  the  time  they were made, 
which would have required all funding conditions to have been met, the total 
value  of  the  offers  would  have  exceeded  the  funds  available  in  the  EYQF 
Special Account. 
Recommendation No.1  
4.59 To enhance the equity, transparency and accountability of future grant 
programs,  the  ANAO  recommends  that  the  Department  of  Education  and 
Training:  
(a) reinforces  the obligation  to manage all aspects of  the grant process  in 
accordance  with  the  approved  program  guidelines  and  the 
Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines;  
(b) when  conducting  granting  activities,  adopts  eligibility  criteria  which 
reflect  the  core  objective  of  the  granting  activity  and  are  capable  of 
appropriate scrutiny and objective validation;  
(c) adheres  to  documented  eligibility  criteria  in  line  with  program 
guidelines and closely considers the impacts of any proposed changes; 
any  changes  adopted  should  be  documented  and  approved  in  a 
manner  consistent  with  the  Commonwealth  Grants  Rules  and 
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5. Finalisation of the Early Years 
Quality Fund 
This  chapter  examines  the  advice  the  department  provided  to  applicants  after  the 
funding  decision  was  made,  the  processes  followed  in  developing  the  funding 
agreements  during  the  caretaker  period,  and  subsequent  variations  to  funding 
agreements.  
Introduction 
5.1 After  applicants  are  approved  under  a  grant  program,  consideration 
should be given to announcing the outcome and the provision of feedback to 
all  applicants  to  support  transparency  and  accountability  of  the 
decision‐making  process.  To  this  extent,  the  Joint  Committee  of  Public 
Accounts and Audit has emphasised the importance of providing feedback to 
applicants as part of grants administration.101  
5.2 It  is  also  important  that  the  development  and  negotiation  of  grant 
agreements  is effectively administered. Not  least  to ensure  that well drafted, 
fit‐for‐purpose  funding  agreements  are  entered  into  that  contribute  to  good 
governance  and  accountability.102  At  the  completion  of  the  EYQF  grant 
assessment process, 453 grants were approved covering in excess of 1250 child 
care  services,  and  almost  24 000  employees.  This  represented  around 
30 per cent of long day care staff and 20 per cent of services. By close of business 
6 September 2013, the day prior to the Federal election, funding agreements had 
been  sent  to 1  large provider, Goodstart Early Learning  (for $132 million) and 
15 small  providers  (for  a  total  of  $5 million)  covering  11 710  employees. 
Subsequently, program changes have resulted in the 16 agreements being either 
varied  or  terminated.  As  at  30 June 2014,  $62.5 million  had  been  paid 
under EYQF. 
5.3 In this context, the ANAO examined the: 
 advice  provided  by  the  department  to  successful,  unsuccessful, 
after‐cap and potential applicants; 
                                                     
101  Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2011 Report 423: Review of Auditor-General’s Reports 
Nos 39 2009-10 to 15 2010-11, Canberra p.viii 
102  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Grant Guidelines, Second Edition, 
June 2013, p. 54. 
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Announcing grants and feedback to applicants 
5.4 Sensitivities  can  exist  around  the  timing  of  grant  announcements, 
particularly  during  an  election  period.103  However,  it  is  important  that  the 
announcement  of  the  outcome  of  a  grant  program  be  made  as  soon  as 
practicable  after  the  funding  decision,  particularly  with  a  program  such  as 
EYQF  for which  there was a high demand and a  limited  funding pool. This 
avoids  the  risk  of  potential  applicants  placing  unnecessary  resources  into 
applying for a program where no funding is available.  
The funding cap 
5.5 The department recognised  the risk of over‐subscription and noted  in 
the program guidelines that advice would be posted to the EYQF website and 
provided  through  the  Child  Care  Management  System  (CCMS)  when  the 
funding  cap was  reached. Providers  that  had  already  lodged  an  application 
were also to be notified via email as soon as possible that the funding cap had 
been reached and  that  their applications would not be assessed. In  the event, 
advice to potential applicants that the cap had been reached was not timely. 
5.6 The department  recognised  that  the  funding  cap had  been  reached  as 
early as 24 July 2013, and this advice was passed to the delegate, together with a 
draft message for approval for posting on the web and to be emailed via CCMS 
informing  providers  that  the  indicative  cap  had  been  reached.  The  delegate 
decided  to  hold  the  message  pending  advice  from  the  Minister’s  office. 
However, advice from the Minister’s office was that the message should not be 
released  at  that  time.  By  the  time  the  delegate  agreed  to  the  final  funding 
recommendations  (on  2 August),  the  department  noted  that  it  had  registered 
approximately  942 EYQF  applications.  Although  precise  figures  were  not 
available  due  to  the  ongoing  processing  of  applications,  the  department’s 
                                                     
103  ANAO Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration – Better Practice Guide December 2013, 
p. 76. 
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assessment  was  the  funding  cap  had  been  reached  when  the  number  of 










was fully committed. However,  the department was (on  this occasion and  then 
later on other occasions through to late August) unable to obtain agreement from 
the Minister’s office for the message to be released. The department placed itself 
in  a difficult position  in  electing  to  refer  the decision  to  release  advice  of  this 
nature to the Minister. This decision had consequential impacts on the ability of 
the  department  to  respond  accurately  to  questions  from  potential  applicants 
about whether to apply. Substantive information about the status of the program 
was not put on the department’s website until the end of October 2013. 
Advice to applicants 
Successful applicants 
5.8 In  accordance  with  the  EYQF  guidelines,  the  majority  of  the 
453 successful applicants  received advice on  the outcome of  their application 
via  a  conditional  letter104  of  offer  which  was  dispatched  to  them  between 
27 July 2013  and  2 August 2013.  There  were  a  number  of  variations  in  the 
content  of  the  conditional  letters  of  offer,  including  advice  that  offers  were 
contingent on  the  approval of  an  enterprise  agreement  containing  the EYQF 
wage schedule, and other sundry details that required confirmation. The letters 
advised applicants of the total possible funding amount available, recognising 
that  the  amount  would  be  reduced  pending  the  provider  meeting  all 
conditions set out in the letter. Applicants were provided eight weeks, or until 
27 September 2013,  to  finalise  the  requisite  enterprise  agreements,  and/or 
provide other required information.  
                                                     
104  Copies of the signed letters were located in the department’s files in respect of all but seven 
applications, although there is other evidence that these providers were notified. 
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of  the process,  including advice on  the assessment criteria  that had not been 
met.  The  guidelines  also  stated  that  unsuccessful  applicants  may  re‐apply 
while funds were available. On 1 August 2013 the department decided to send 
letters  of  advice  to  17 unsuccessful  applicants  (one  ineligible  and 
16 non‐compliant), however the letters were not sent until 16 August 2013. The 
letters  also  included  the  advice  that  applicants  were  invited  to  reapply  by 
20 August 2013, although as noted at paragraph 5.6, the department was aware 
that the funding had been fully expended on 2 August 2013. Due to this advice 
and  the  failure  to  announce  that  the  funding  cap  had  been  reached  on  the 
EYQF website, 15 of these applicants re‐submitted applications.  
5.10 A decision was made by the department on 20 August 2013 to send the 
same  letter to  the second  tranche of 13 unsuccessful applicants. However,  the 
second  tranche  of  unsuccessful  applicants  never  received  a  formal  letter  of 
advice outlining the basis of non‐compliance, the department having received 









in  the main  record  that were  received after  the  funding cap was  reached. The 
department provided advice  to all but five of these applicants  in a  letter dated 
22 October 2013,  also  eleven weeks  after  the  funding decision was made. The 
letter did not provide any information about making a complaint if dissatisfied. 
                                                     
105  This application was identified as being connected to another application in the main record (although 
it was assessed as non-compliant by the department and recorded as such in the approval minute).  
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The funding agreement development and negotiation 
process 
5.12 Funding  agreements  are  used  to  formalise  the  provision  of 
Commonwealth grant funding to a grant recipient. The agreement specifies the 
terms and conditions of the grant, including any reciprocal obligations for the 







were  approved  for  funding  and  sent  a  conditional  letter  of  offer.  After  the 
453 conditional  letters  of  offer  were  dispatched  in  early  August 2013,  the 
department commenced the detailed work involved in developing the funding 
agreements,  cognisant  that  the government had entered  into  caretaker mode 
on 5 August 2013. Throughout the caretaker period, the department responded 
to  the  Minister’s  office  requests  for  updates  at  various  points.  Late  in 
August 2013 the department was requested by the Minister’s office to provide 
a list of all applicants that were ready to proceed to funding agreement. A list 





combined  list of  45 applicants. The variances  could not be  reconciled with  the 
department’s records of the assessment process. In particular, one applicant was 
on  the 26 August  list, but not  the 27 August  list although  this  applicant had  a 
compliant EA at both dates. Two applicants on the department’s list did not have 
an  approved  EA  at  either  26 or  27 August  which  indicates  these  applicants 
should  not  have  been  on  either  list.  The  department  was  then  instructed  to 
prepare funding agreements for each of the 44 applicants on the list of 27 August.  
5.15 From these 44 applicants, 16 applicants (15 small providers and one large 
provider) were  selected by  the department  to enter  into a  funding agreement. 
The  department  did  not  formally  record  the  reasons  for  the  selection  of  the 
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5.16 During  the  period  preceding  an  election,  the  government  assumes  a 
caretaker  role,  which  begins  at  the  time  the  House  of  Representatives  is 
dissolved and continues until the new government is appointed.106 Throughout 
this  period,  the  ordinary  business  of  government  is  expected  to  continue, 
however,  certain  caretaker  conventions  operate  to  limit  any  significant 
decisions,  appointments  or  commitments  a  new  government  would  be 
expected  to meet.107  The  conventions  are  flexible  rules  that  have  evolved  in 
response  to  circumstance,  they  are  generally  agreed  by  all,  but may  not  be 
codified  in  precise  terms.  The  conventions  that  apply  during  an  election 
include  that  a  government  avoids  entering  major  contracts  or  undertakings 
unless necessary,  in which  event  the Minister would usually be  expected  to 
consult the opposition beforehand.  
5.17 In  this  regard,  the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet 
(PM&C)  provides  information  and  advice  to  agencies,  but  responsibility  for 
observing the conventions ultimately rests with entity heads or Ministers. The 
caretaker  period  for  the  2013 Federal  election  began  on  5 August 2013,  and 





106  The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Guidance on Caretaker Conventions, 2013, 
paragraph 1.1, available at: <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/docs/caretaker_conventions.pdf> 
[accessed 11 June 2014]. 
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5.18 The  department  approached  PM&C  for  advice  on  executing  all 
453 funding  agreements  early  in  the  caretaker period. PM&C’s  advice noted 
that  the  allocations  to  the  three  large  service  providers  were  major 
commitments and  that while  the payments  to  small providers may not have 
constituted major  commitments  they may have  the  effect of  entrenching  the 
program.  If  the  department  was  required  to  proceed  during  the  caretaker 
period, PM&C noted it would be advisable for the Minister to consult with the 
opposition prior to finalising any grant payments.  
5.19 The Minister  agreed  to  consult with  the  opposition  in  relation  to  the 
agreements, but DEEWR only focused on the need for agreement in relation to 
Goodstart Early Learning. Correspondence prepared  for  the Minister  by  the 
department  did  not make  reference  to  other  applicants  that  the  department 
proposed to enter into an agreement with.  
5.20  The  Minister’s  correspondence  to  the  opposition  spokesperson  on 
30 August 2013  indicated  the  government’s  intention  to  execute  the  funding 
agreement  for  Goodstart  Early  Learning,  noting  that  ‘the  Government  is 
conscious  that  this  grant  is  an  important  and  necessary  investment  in 
strengthening  the  early  childhood workforce  as  it  is  for  a provider with  642 
services  and  over  11 000  early  childhood  educators  across  Australia.’  The 
opposition  spokesperson  was  asked  to  respond  to  the  request  by 
4 September 2013.  
5.21 The Minister wrote  to  the Secretary of DEEWR on 4 September  to ask 
her  ‘to  ensure  the  expeditious processing of agreements’,  and  to  ensure  that 
funding agreements included termination clauses. After receiving advice from 
PM&C,  the department decided  to action  this  letter as  if  it were a direction. 
PM&C also advised the department that if the opposition spokesperson failed 
to respond to the Minister’s letter, it could be taken to mean the opposition had 
no  objection,  and  a  decision  to  continue  to  send  out  and  process  returned 
agreements  in  the  remaining caretaker period would be defensible, however, 
advising  recipients  to  expedite  their  responses  would  not  be  considered 
appropriate.  
5.22 After  the  opposition  spokesperson  did  not  respond  to  the Minister’s 
letter  in  the  time  provided,  the  Minister’s  office  formally  instructed  the 
department  to  execute  the  funding  agreement  for Goodstart Early Learning. 
The  Minister’s  office  also  requested  the  department  provide  funding 
agreements to the other 15 providers.  
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5.23 On 6 September 2013, the then Opposition released  its policy  for Better 
Child Care and Early Learning; announced  the Ministerial review of  the EYQF; 
and  stated  it would honour  the payment  of  funds  already  contracted  at  the 
time of  the election.108 The department,  in consultation with PM&C, affirmed 
that  it would continue  to process contracts  in  the normal course of business, 
but  in  the  event  of  a  change  in  government, would  not  enter  into  any  new 
contracts.  Twelve funding  agreements  were  finalised  on  6 September 2013, 
signed  by  both  the  Commonwealth  and  the  respective  providers;  the 
remaining  four  agreements  were  not  signed  by  both  parties  prior  to  the 
election, but were considered  to have  the same  legal status as  those  that had 
been formally executed.  
Electorate distribution  
5.24 The  ANAO  examined  the  electoral  distribution  of  the  16 funded 
services and compared these to the services under the 44 providers  identified 
by the department on 27 August 2013 as having met the conditions of funding.  
5.25 The  analysis  shows  the distribution  of  funding  to  the  services  of  the 
16 providers  that signed a  funding agreement did not  indicate party‐political 





that were  funded. The  remainder of services were  located  in electorates held 
by independent Members of Parliament and the Greens.  
Review of the EYQF  
5.26 On  coming  into  office  in  September 2013,  the  new  government 
announced  a  Ministerial  review  of  the  establishment  and  implementation 




for  child  care  educators.  The  new  program  is  directed  towards  assisting 
                                                     
108  Liberal Party of Australia, The Coalition’s policy for Better Child Care and Early Learning, 
September 2013, p. 8. 
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Renegotiation of executed funding agreements 
5.27 Upon  announcing  the  decision  to  terminate  the  EYQF  on 
10 December 2013, the Assistant Minister invited the 16 providers that received 









5.28 Of  the  16  providers  that  had  received  EYQF  funding  agreements 
11 elected not to vary their original funding agreements. Three other providers 
agreed  to  use  funding  for  professional  development  and  wages,109  and  the 
remaining  two  agreed  to  use  funding  solely  for  professional  development. 
Deeds of variation were prepared for all 16 providers reflecting the variations 
to  the  total funding, and for five providers,  the amended purposes for which 
the funding was to be used. Consideration was given to whether the variations 
to the purposes in the signed funding agreements would be consistent with the 
Special  Account.  However,  there  is  little  documentation  indicating  that  a 
similar consideration was given  to whether  the changes created substantially 
different  arrangements  from  those  agreed  to  in  the  original  funding 
agreements  approved  in  accordance  with  the  EYQF  guidelines.110  In  this 
context,  the  objective  of  the  EYQF  was  to  offer  higher  wages,  although 
provision  is  also  made  in  the  guidelines  to  use  underspent  funds  for 
professional development activities.  
5.29 In  June 2014,  ten  months  after  the  original  agreements  were  signed; 
$62.5 million was paid to 16 providers. This amount was the cumulative total 
                                                     
109  Following an exchange of letters, Goodstart elected to vary its funding agreement. It received the first 
instalment of the payment due under the EYQF and undertook to make the payment as a lump sum to 
currently employed educators on its staff. 
110  ANAO Better Practice Guide, Developing and Managing Contracts, Canberra, February 2012, p. 87. 
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of  the 16  first  instalment payments  the government agreed  to pay under  the 
original funding agreements. Of the $62.5 million, $51.3 million was devoted to 
wages, $4.9 million to on‐costs and $6.3 million to professional development.  
Advice to successful, unfunded applicants 
5.30 The department sent a letter dated 20 December 2013 to the remaining 
approved applicants  confirming  the advice provided  in  the 11 October  letter 
that  the  funding  offer was  revoked. The  letter  closed by  acknowledging  the 
possible costs incurred by providers in entering into an Enterprise Agreement 
(a condition of funding under the EYQF) and  indicated the willingness of the 
government  to  consider  a  claim  for  costs,  stating  that  further  information 
would be forthcoming in that respect.  
5.31 The  EYQF  program  delegate  signed  an  FMA  Regulation  9  funding 
approval for the reimbursement of costs associated with the development of an 
enterprise  agreement  from  the  EYQF  Special  Account  up  to  $4  million  on 
28 February 2014. The Assistant Minister also approved the reimbursement of 
costs  under  the  EYQF  and  the  process  for  doing  so  on  27 March 2014.  The 
reimbursement funds were to be drawn from the Special Account as per advice 
received from the Australian Government Solicitor.  




the  supporting  evidence  required.  The  applicants  were  to  email  the  EYQF 
mailbox to receive forms from the department to submit a claim. Department 
records  indicate  that  91 claims  for  reimbursement  were  received,  of  which 
85 were  approved.  The  remaining  claims  either  did  not  meet  the  eligibility 
requirements or the applicants failed to provide further information to support 
their  claims.  The  website  indicated  that  claims  would  be  accepted  until 
12 May 2014;  however,  the  department  noted  it  continued  to  accept  claims 
after  this  date,  receiving  26 claims  post  12 May 2014.  The  last  claim  was 
received  on  17 June 2014  and  processed  on  3 July 2014.  As  at 
18 September 2014,  the department’s website no  longer  included  information 
about the reimbursement of costs.  
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were  advised  promptly  about  the  outcome  of  the  EYQF  after  the  funding 
decision was  reached,  the  advice  to  the majority  of  applicants,  including  to 
potential applicants that the funding cap had been reached, was unreasonably 
delayed.  Some  unsuccessful  applicants  received  letters  of  advice  suggesting 
they  reapply  for  funding when  the department  knew  there was no  funding 




one  day  before  the  Federal  election  during  the  caretaker  period.  Had  all 





for  $132 million.  The  department  subsequently  advised  that  it  focused  on 
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Appendix 1: Entities’ Responses 
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Appendix 2: Key Features of the Aged Care Compact 
and the Equal Remuneration Order for 
Social and Community Services 
Employees 
The Aged Care Workforce Compact 
1. Under the aged care workforce compact,111 to be eligible for government 
funding,  providers  would  have  been  required  to  negotiate  enterprise 
agreements for workers. Eligibility conditions would have required an employer 
to phase in (over four years) a three per cent wage increase above the award rate 




The SACS Equal Remuneration Order 
2. Fair  Work  Australia  handed  down  an  equal  remuneration  order  on 
1 February 2012, in the form of a percentage rate of increase to be added to the 
existing rates of pay contained in the award for Social and Community Services 
(SACS)  employees. The  result was  that  the wage of  a  SACS  employee would 
increase by approximately $8 000 to $27 000. To enable employers and funding 
(state  and  territory) governments  to  adjust  to  the new  rates,  the  increases  are 
being  implemented  in  equal  instalments  over  an  eight  year  period  that 
commenced on 1 December 2012 and will conclude on 1 December 2020. 
                                                     
111  The Aged Care Workforce Compact was halted by the Government in September 2013. 
112  Pay increase figures in this paragraph have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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Appendix 3: Application and Assessment Records 
Assessment outcome Number of applications 





Eligible and compliant 435 458 453 
Ineligible and non-compliant 33 32 30 
Application related to another 
submission 128 121 129 
Assessed as compliant N/A N/A 7 
After-cap (not assessed) 1 1 3 
Unclear/Missing 25 10 N/A 
TOTAL 622 622 622 
Source: ANAO analysis of department records. 
Note: The data relates to the 622 submissions recorded on the department’s main record as having been 
received before the funding cap was reached and includes three additional small provider 
applications received and assessed before the final application approved (but recorded on the 
main record as being received after the cap was reached). 
1. The above table does not take account of errors in the process identified 
by the ANAO. Also, many of the numbers in the table are interchangeable as a 
result of re‐assessments  throughout  the process. Although, where  the ANAO 
has  been  able  to  undertake  an  analysis  of  the  applications,  the  assessment 
sheets, the approval and reconciliation mainly record a consistent outcome. 
2. The basis  for  the  final outcome  is generally not recorded,  for example 
while the reconciliation brief (which is reflected in the main record) identified 
the changed status of some applications, the basis for this change is limited to 
the  fact  that an error was  identified and a  treatment applied. With  regard  to 
the applications  identified as unclear and or missing,  the ANAO could either 
not determine the decision of the department  in relation to these applications 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives  Oct. 2014 
Public Sector Governance: Strengthening Performance through Good 
Governance 
June 2014 
Administering Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance  June 2014 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and Controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An Investment in Assurance and Business 
Improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the Environmental 
Impacts of Public Sector Operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the Right Outcome, 
Achieving Value for Money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent Assurance and Advice for 
Chief Executives and Boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering Agreed Outcomes through an Efficient and 
Optimal Asset Base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
Foundation for Results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling Better Performance, Driving 
New Directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and Control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building Resilience in Public Sector 
Entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
 
 
 
 
  
 
